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ASSIGNMENT OF RENTS IN MORTGAGE LOAN
TRANSACTIONS'
JuliaPattersonForrester*
Abstract
This Article explores the problems caused by the absolute assignment
of rents in mortgage loan transactions, which have continued for more than
a century, and discusses possible solutions. Rents are a significant part of
the security for loans secured by income-producing properties such as
office buildings, shopping centers, and apartments. Under present law in
many states, the absolute assignment of rents is the only means by which
lenders can create an effective security interest in the rents of mortgaged
property. An absolute assignment of rents purports to transfer title to rents
to the mortgage lender, although in substance it creates a security interest
in rents. This Article explores the historical development of the absolute
assignment of rents and discusses the confusion, unnecessary litigation,
and in some cases, injustice that it causes under state law and federal
bankruptcy law. The National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform
State Laws has recently approved the new Uniform Assignment of Rents
Act, which removes the necessity for absolute assignments of rents by
creating a workable and comprehensive scheme for the creation of security
interests in rents. This Article concludes by discussing the Act and
recommending its adoption.
1. PAUL SIMON, Still CrazyAfter All These Years, on STILLCRAZYAFTERALLTHESEYEARS
(Columbia Records 1975).
* Associate Professor of Law, Southern Methodist University School of Law, Dallas,
Texas; B.S.E.E. 1981, J.D. 1985, The University of Texas at Austin. I wish to thank Ken Elmgren,
Wilson Freyermuth, and Paul Rogers for their comments on drafts of this Article; Laura Justiss for
her assistance as a research librarian; and Derek Dansby, Victoria Marchand Rossi, and Joshua
Somers for their research assistance. In addition, I gratefully acknowledge the research grant
provided by Southern Methodist University Dedman School of Law.

FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

I.

II.

[Vol. 59

INTRODUCTION .....................................
488
A. The Nature of Rents and Security Interests in Rents ..... 492
DEFICIENCIES OF THE COLLATERAL ASSIGNMENT

OF RENTS .......................................... 495

111.

IV.

A. The PerfectionProblem ...........................
B. The Enforcement Problem .........................
C. The Right to Previously CollectedRents ..............

495
500
504

HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE ABSOLUTE
ASSIGNMENT OF RENTS ..............................

505

CREATION AND CONSEQUENCES OF THE ABSOLUTE

ASSIGNMENT OF RENTS ..............................

A. Debatingthe Effect of the Absolute Assignment
of Rents .......................................
B. Creatingan Absolute Assignment of Rents ............
C. State Law Consequences of Confusion over
Characterizingan Absolute Assignment of Rents .......
D. The Absolute Assignment of Rents in Bankruptcy .......
E. Analogous "Absolute" Transfersfor Security ..........
V.

VI.

512
512
515
517
519
522

A. The JudicialSolution .............................
B. The Uniform Assignment of Rents Act ................

524
524
525

CONCLUSION .......................................

528

SOLUTIONS TO THE PROBLEM .........................

I. INTRODUCTION

For more than one hundred years, the absolute assignment of rents in
mortgage loan transactions has caused confusion, increased transaction
costs, litigation, and in some cases, injustice. The absolute assignment of
rents is a necessary evil in many states, however, because mortgage lenders
require an effective security interest in rents of mortgaged property.
When a loan is secured by a mortgage or deed of trust on an incomeproducing property, such as an office building, shopping center, or
apartment complex, rents are a significant part of the security for the loan,
in addition to the land and improvements.2 Rents provide the funds
necessary to pay for operating and maintaining the mortgaged property,

2. See Julia Patterson Forrester, A Uniform and More Rational Approach to Rents as
Securityfor the MortgageLoan, 46 RUTGERS L. REv. 349, 349-50 (1993).
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and to make payments on the mortgage loan.3 After a default on the
mortgage loan, a borrower, facing the possibility of losing the property to
foreclosure, may apply rents to purposes unrelated to the property or the
mortgage loan.4 The lender, on the other hand, wants rents collected after
default to be applied to operation and maintenance of the property or to the
mortgage debt.5 Therefore, a lender wants the ability to control rents from
mortgaged property in the event of a default, and to this end will require
the borrower to execute an assignment of rents at the loan closing.6
Unfortunately, the law governing assignments of rents is illogical and
confusing 7 and varies significantly from state to state.

3. See id. at 350.
4. This practice is sometimes called "milking" the rents. Id. The borrower may spend rents
to benefit other properties, to build a "war chest" of funds to pay attorneys' fees for a bankruptcy
filing or litigation against the lender, or for other purposes unrelated to the mortgaged property. See
id.
5. Id.
6. The assignment of rents or other "[l]oan documents may also contain restrictions on the
ability of the borrower to enter into, modify, or terminate leases" without the lender's consent or
to accept prepayments of rent, and tenants are often "required to acknowledge the assignment of
rents and the restrictions on modification or termination of leases or on prepayments of rent." Id.
at 350 n.5. Loan documents may require that the borrower apply rents to pay expenses of operating
and maintaining the property and to pay the mortgage debt. See id. When the loan is nonrecourse,
the lender is particularly interested in the borrower's use of rents, "and the application of rents for
purposes other than operation, maintenance, or payment of the loan may be an exception to the
nonrecourse status of the loan." Id.
7. Because of this confusion, the law governing assignments of rents in mortgage loan
transactions has been the subject of numerous law review articles over the years. See, e.g., Robert
Abelow, An HistoricalAnalysis of Assignments of Rent in New York, 6 BROOK. L. REV. 25, 25
(1936); Morris Berick, The Mortgagee's Right to Rents, 8 U. CIN. L. REV. 250, 252 (1934);
Forrester, supranote 2, at 377-83; R. Wilson Freyermuth, Modernizing Security in Rents: The New
Uniform Assignment of Rents Act, 71 Mo. L. REV. 1, 1 (2006) [hereinafter Freyermuth, The New
UARA]; R. Wilson Freyermuth, Of Hotel Revenues, Rents, and Formalism in the Bankruptcy
Courts: Implicationsfor Reforming CommercialReal Estate Finance,40 UCLA L. REV. 1461,
1462-64 (1993) [hereinafter Freyermuth, Of Hotel Revenues]; Carlos L. Israels & Milton A.
Kramer, The Significanceof the Income Clause in a CorporateMortgage, 30 COLUM. L. REV. 488,
488 (1930); Comment, The Mortgagee'sRight to Rents After Default, 50 YALE L.J. 1424, 1424-25
(1941). The focus of most of the articles published in the past twenty years has been the treatment
of assignments of rents in bankruptcy. See, e.g., Craig H. Averch et al., The Treatmentof Net Rents
in Bankruptcy--AdequateProtection, Payment of Interest, Return of Collateral,or Reduction of
Debt, 48 U. MIAMI L. REV. 691,692-96 (1994); David Gray Carlson, Rents in Bankruptcy, 46 S.C.
L. REV. 1075, 1075-77 (1995); R. Wilson Freyermuth, The Circus Continues-SecurityInterestin
Rents, Congress, the Bankruptcy Courts, and the "Rents Are Subsumed in the Land" Hypothesis,
6 J. BANKR. L. & PRAC. 115, 115-17 (1997); James McCafferty, The Assignment of Rents in the
Crucible of Bankruptcy, 94 COM. L.J. 433,433-34 (1989); Patrick A. Randolph, Jr., Recognizing
Lenders'Rents Interests in Bankruptcy, 27 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 281, 281-85 (1992); Glenn
R. Schmitt, The ContinuingConfusionover Real PropertyRents as Cash Collateralin Bankruptcy:
The Needfor a ConsistentInterpretation,5 DEPAUL Bus. L.J. 1, 1-5 (1993).
8. See infra notes 33-38 and accompanying text.
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Different types of assignments of rents have developed depending upon
the applicable state law and the agreement reached between the borrower
and the mortgage lender. Occasionally, lenders control rents from the time
the loan is made, applying the rents first to loan payments and releasing the
excess to the borrower to use for operating and maintaining the property.
Much more commonly, however, the parties agree that the borrower has
the right to control rents until after default. One type of assignment of
rents, referred to as a collateral assignment of rents in this Article in order
to distinguish it from an absolute assignment, creates one kind of security
interest in rents. With a collateral assignment of rents, the borrower has the
right to collect rents until the lender, upon the borrower's default, takes
some affirmative action, such as taking possession of the mortgaged
property, obtaining the appointment of a receiver, or demanding rents from
the borrower or tenants. 9 In many states, a lender must take some
burdensome action, such as taking possession of the property, in order to
enforce a collateral assignment of rents even if the parties have agreed that
the lender is entitled to rents upon demand, and in some states, a collateral
assignment may be treated as unperfected until it is enforced.'" As a result,
lenders prefer another type of assignment of rents, called an absolute
assignment of rents, which purports to transfer title to rents to the lender
upon default. The absolute assignment provides that the borrower may
collect rents until default, often based on a license from lender to borrower,
but the lender's right to collect rents accrues automatically and
immediately upon the borrower's default."
In states that do not give meaningful effect to a collateral assignment
of rents, lenders obviously prefer an absolute assignment of rents, and
borrowers are willing to execute absolute assignments of rents. However,
because many courts are hostile to finding an absolute assignment, lenders
have had difficulty over the years creating enforceable absolute
assignments. In many states, effective creation of an absolute assignment
of rents requires the pretense of a transfer of title to rents that is not a
security interest. 2 This drafting challenge and the resulting litigation have
continued for more than a century. 3

9. See infranotes 70-74 and accompanying text.
10. See infranotes 44-49 and accompanying text.
11. See infranote 88 and accompanying text.
12. See infra Part IV.B.
13. In 1894, the Missouri Court of Appeals held that a lender's assignment of rents was not
an absolute assignment because the assignment stated that it was given "as additional security for
the payment of... notes." Armour Packing Co. v. Wolff& Co., 59 Mo. App. 665, 665 (Ct. App.
1894). In 2001, the Bankruptcy Court for the Western District of Tennessee held that a lender's
assignment of rents was not an absolute assignment despite language in the document that the
borrower "absolutely and unconditionally" assigned the rents. In re 5877 Poplar, L.P., 268 B.R.
140, 146-47 (Bankr. W.D. Tenn. 2001). In the years between these two cases, numerous courts also
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When courts do find an absolute assignment of rents, significant
uncertainty exists over its effect. Some courts hold that the absolute
assignment is a transfer of title to the rents, while others hold that it creates
a security interest, albeit a different type of security interest from that
created by a collateral assignment of rents.' 4 This confusion has played out
to some extent in state courts, but to a greater extent in bankruptcy courts
after the borrower files a petition in bankruptcy. Therefore, although state
law governs assignments of rents, federal courts frequently determine the
current state of the law in the various jurisdictions.
This Article addresses the confusion over the absolute assignment of
rents, the unnecessary litigation and injustice caused by this disorder, and
possible solutions to the problem. 5 Part I discusses the legal theories
underlying the creation of a security interest in rents. Part II explains the
problems that have caused lenders to prefer absolute assignments over
collateral assignments, including problems relating to perfection,
enforcement, and access to rents collected by the borrower after default.
Part III explores the development of absolute assignments of rents from the
late nineteenth century into the twentieth century.
Part IV discusses the disarray caused by absolute assignments of rents,
including the challenge that lenders face in creating them, the varying
treatment of absolute assignments by state and federal courts, and the
problems caused by absolute assignments under state law and federal
bankruptcy law. Part IV also discusses how the absolute assignment of
rents should be treated. Despite its form, an absolute assignment of rents
in a mortgage loan transaction creates a security interest in substance.
Finally, Part IV provides analogies to other areas of the law in which
courts have more successfully determined the substance of a security
transaction despite its form.
Part V examines possible solutions. One solution is judicial. Courts
could adopt the approach of the Restatement of Property-Mortgages that
makes the charade of the absolute assignment of rents unnecessary.
However, after more than one hundred years of disarray, this change is

addressed the issue of whether an assignment of rents is absolute. See infra Part IV.B for a
discussion of these cases.
14. See infra Part IV.A.
15. This is not my first article that proposes a solution. In 1993, I examined the problems of
using rents as security for a mortgage loan and proposed that security interests in rents should be
covered by Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code. See Forrester, supra note 2, at 402.
Independently, but at the same time, Professor Wilson Freyermuth reached the same conclusion.
See Freyermuth, OfHotel Revenues, supranote 7, at 1467. Some of the members of the PEB Study
Group's Advisory Group on Real Estate-Related Collateral recommended that rents be covered by
Article 9, see PERMANENT EDITORIAL BD. FOR THE UNIF. COMMERCIAL CODE, PEB STUDY GROUP
UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE ARTICLE 9 app. at 154-55 (1992), but rents were ultimately excluded
from Article 9. See U.C.C. § 9-109(d)(1 1) (2000).

FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 59

unlikely to occur quickly. A faster and more comprehensive solution is a
legislative one-adoption of the new Uniform Assignment of Rents Act
(UARA),1 6 which also removes the necessity for absolute assignments of
rents and, at the same time, clarifies and simplifies the law relating to
assignments of rents. Part V also discusses the scheme adopted by UARA
to handle the complex issues raised by assignments of rents in mortgage
loan transactions.17
The absolute assignment of rents has created havoc in commercial real
estate loans for too long. More than a century of confusion, unnecessary
litigation, and injustice is enough. With UARA now recommended for
enactment, a good solution is in the wings and state legislatures should
adopt it.
A. The Nature of Rents and Security Interests in Rents
The right to unaccrued rents from real property is an incorporeal
hereditament-an interest in land incident to the landlord's reversion. 8 The
right to collect rents is part of the bundle of property rights covered by a
mortgage ofthe real property to which they relate. Therefore, a foreclosure

16. In 2003, the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws (NCCUSL)
appointed a drafting committee to prepare a UARA at the urging of the Joint Editorial Board for
Uniform Real Property Acts. See Freyermuth, The New UARA, supranote 7, at 3. In July 2005, the
NCCUSL approved the UARA and recommended it for enactment in all states. UNI. ASSIGNMENT
OF RENTS ACT (2005), availableat http://www.law.upenn.edu/bll/ulc/maripp/ 2005Final.pdf.
17. A full discussion of all of the provisions of the UARA is outside the scope of this Article.
For such a discussion, see Freyermuth, The New UARA, supra note 7.
18. Norwest Bank Ariz. v. Superior Court, 963 P.2d 319,323 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1998) (quoting
Valley Nat'l Bank of Ariz. v. AVCO Dev. Co., 480 P.2d 671, 673 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1971); see also
Winnisimmet Trust, Inc. v. Libby, 122 N.E. 575, 576 (Mass. 1919); First & Citizens Nat'l Bank
of Elizabeth City v. Sawyer, 10 S.E.2d 656, 658 (N.C. 1940); Marine Nat'l Bank v. Nw. Pa. Bank
& Trust Co., 454 A.2d 67, 70 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1982); Schmid v. Baum's Home of Flowers, Inc., 37
S.W.2d 105, 108 (Tenn. 1931). Blackstone listed rents among the ten principal incorporeal
hereditaments. See WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 2 COMMENTARIES *21.
Jurisdictions are split on the issue whether rents are severed from the real property when they
accrue, see, e.g., White v. Irvine, 22 S.W.2d 778, 778-79 (Mo. 1929); MarineNat'lBank, 454 A.2d
at 70, or when they are collected, see, e.g., In re Park at Dash Point L.P., 121 B.R. 850, 855 (Bankr.
W.D. Wash. 1990), aff'dsub nom. Steinberg v. Crossland Mortgage Corp. (In re Park at Dash Point
L.P.), 152 B.R. 300 (W.D. Wash. 1991), aff'd, 985 F.2d 1008 (9th Cir. 1993); Treetop Apts. Gen.
P'ship v. Oyster, 800 S.W.2d 628, 629 (Tex. App. 1990). A severence also occurs when the right
to unaccrued rents is assigned to a third party, see, e.g., Valley Nat'l Bank, 480 P.2d at 674; Brack
v. Coburn, 196 S.W.2d 230, 234 (Ark. 1946); Winnisimmet, 122 N.E. at 576; Schmid, 37 S.W.2d
at 108; reserved in a transfer of the landlord's reversion, see, e.g., Jim Davis & Co. v. Albuquerque
Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n., 536 So. 2d 55, 58 (Ala. 1988) (quoting Walsh v. Bank of Moundville,
132 So. 52, 53 (Ala. 1930)); Brack, 196 S.W.2d at 234; Winnisimmet, 122 N.E. at 576; Tinnon v.
Tanksley, 408 S.W.2d 98, 105 (Mo. 1966); or pledged as security for a loan apart from the land.
See, e.g., Treetop, 800 S.W.2d at 629 (citing Standridge v. Vines, 81 S.W.2d 289, 290 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1935)).
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sale purchaser is entitled to rents accruing after the date of foreclosure
from leases that remain in effect after the foreclosure.' 9 In most states,
however, in the absence of an assignment of rents, the borrower has the
right to collect rents until the lender takes possession of the property as a
mortgagee-in-possession or after foreclosure, or until a receiver takes
possession of the property.20
Because the foreclosure process is lengthy in many states,2 ' significant
time may elapse between the borrower's default and the completion of a
foreclosure sale. During that period, a lender may wish to exercise
provisional remedies, such as securing the appointment of a receiver for
the property, taking possession of the property, or collecting rents from the
property. The availability of these provisional remedies depends upon state
law where the mortgaged property is located and the effect given to the
mortgage instrument itself.
The traditional, but now minority, view of the effect of a mortgage is
the title theory, which treats a mortgage as a transfer of title to the property
to the lender.22 In title theory states, the lender theoretically has the right
upon the borrower's execution of the mortgage to take possession of the
mortgaged property and collect the rents therefrom. 23 Most states, however,
are lien theory states in which a mortgage lender is treated as having only
a lien on the mortgaged property, and the borrower retains the right to
possession and rents until completion of foreclosure. 24 Finally, in a few
states, called intermediate states, a mortgage lender has a hybrid interest
19. See Jim Davis & Co., 536 So. 2d at 58 (quoting Walsh, 132 So. at 53); Norwest Bank,
963 P.2d at 323-25; Sec. Sav. & Loan Soc. v. Dudley, 26 P.2d 384, 385 (Wash. 1933).
20. See Teal v. Walker, 111 U.S. 242,248 (1884); Simpson v. Ferguson, 44 P. 484,485 (Cal.
1896); Bornstein v. Somerson, 341 So. 2d 1043, 1048-49 (Fla. 2d DCA 1977); Mid-Continent
Supply Co. v. Hauser, 269 P.2d 453,458 (Kan. 1954); Grafeman Dairy Co. v. Mercantile Club, 241
S.W. 923,927 (Mo. 1922); Wyckoffv. Scofield, 98 N.Y. 475,477 (N.Y. 1885); Met. Life Ins. Co.
v. Begin, 16 N.E.2d 1015, 1016 (Ohio Ct. App. 1938); Treetop, 800 S.W.2d at 629. In title and
intermediate theory states, discussed infranotes 23-27 and accompanying text, a lender may collect
rents from tenants whose leases are senior to the mortgage after default and demand upon the tenant
even without an assignment of rents. See Robert Kratovil, Mortgages-Problemsin Possession,
Rents, and MortgageeLiability, 11 DEPAuL L. REv. 1, 9 (1961).
21. See GRANT S. NELSON & DALE A. WHITMAN, REAL ESTATE FINANCE LAW § 7.1 (4th ed.
2001); Cost and Time Factorsin ForeclosureofMortgages, 3 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 413,41314 (1968). See generally FOREcLOSuRE LAW & RELATED REMEDIES (Sidney A. Keyles ed., 1995)
(describing the foreclosure process in each of the fifty states). A number of states give the borrower
a statutory right of redemption for a period that begins after foreclosure, and in these states it is only
after the statutory redemption period has expired that the borrower's rights in the property are
extinguished. See NELSON & WHITMAN, supra § 8.4.
22. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: MORTGAGES § 4.1 cmt. a (1997); NELSON &
WHITMAN, supra note 21, § 4.1; Kratovil, supranote 20, at 4.
23. See Kratovil, supra note 20, at 5.
24. See id. at 4, 6. In some states the borrower's right of possession is extended until the
expiration of a statutory redemption period. See id. at 5.
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that gives the lender the right to take possession of the property and collect
rents after the borrower's default.25
As a practical matter, the differences between title, lien, and
intermediate theory states may not be so great as they would first appear.
In many lien theory states, a lender has the right to take possession of the
property and collect rents after default if the mortgage has a provision to
that effect. 26 In title theory states, a borrower and lender will generally
agree to permit the borrower to remain in possession of the property at
least until default. 2' Therefore, borrowers and lenders contractually adopt
the treatment of the intermediate theory states in title theory states and in
those lien theory states in which it is permissible, giving the lender the
right to take possession of the property and to begin collecting rents upon
default.
In most states, therefore, a lender may collect rents upon default by
taking possession of the mortgaged property. Rents collected by a lender
in possession of mortgaged property must be applied to pay expenses of
operating and maintaining the property and to the payment of the
indebtedness secured by the mortgage. Even if the lender is not permitted
to take possession of the mortgaged property, the lender has the right to the
appointment of a receiver for the property upon making the required
showing to a court of the necessity therefor. 29 The remedies of possession
by a lender or receivership are necessary for a lender if the borrower is
wasting or mismanaging the mortgaged property.3" However, lenders
usually want the ability upon a default to control rents without taking
possession of the property or obtaining the appointment of a receiver, 31 and
lenders therefore typically require the borrower to execute an assignment
of rents in an attempt to make this remedy available.32
Assignments of rents are recognized as valid and enforceable in every
jurisdiction regardless of the mortgage theory that the jurisdiction has
adopted, but they receive widely varying treatment in different

25. See id. at 4, 6. See generally NELSON & WHITMAN, supranote 21, §§ 4.1-4.3.
26. See, e.g., Kinnison v. Guar. Liquidating Corp., 115 P.2d 450, 452 (Cal. 1941); Topeka
Sav. Ass'n v. Beck, 428 P.2d 779, 782 (Kan. 1967); Cent. Sav. Bank v. First Cadco Corp., 181
N.W.2d 261, 264 (Neb. 1970); Carlquist v. Coltharp, 248 P. 481, 483 (Utah 1926).
27. Massachusetts is a title theory state, see J & W Wall Sys., Inc. v. Shawmut First Bank &
Trust Co., 594 N.E.2d 859, 860 n.3 (Mass. 1992), but the borrower has a statutory right to remain
in possession until default in the absence of an agreement to the contrary, see MASS. GEN. LAWS
ch. 183, § 26 (2006).
28. See NELSON & WHITMAN, supra note 21, § 4.27.
29. See infra notes 83-86 and accompanying text.
30. See NELSON & WHITMAN, supra note 21, § 4.34.
31. For a discussion of the disadvantages to a lender of the mortgagee-in-possession and
receivership remedies, see Part II.B.
32. See NELSON & WHITMAN, supra note 21, § 4.35.
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jurisdictions.33 States vary in the steps required for perfection of a
collateral assignment of rents34 and in the methods permitted for
enforcement.35 Most states recognize and give effect to an absolute
assignment of rents,36 but some states do not recognize the absolute
assignment of rents or treat it the same as a collateral assignment of rents.37
In many states, a collateral assignment of rents will not accomplish the
lender's objectives because of problems relating to perfection,
enforcement, and the lender's access to collected rents. 3' As a result,
lenders often require the borrower to give an absolute assignment of rents.
II. DEFICIENCIES OF THE COLLATERAL ASSIGNMENT OF RENTS

A. The Perfection Problem
The issues that arise with respect to perfection of a security interest in
rents are best understood by first examining perfection of other types of
security interests. Security interests in personal property become effective
between the parties upon creation but must be perfected if the secured
party is to have "maximum... protection against third parties, including

33. See id.
34. See infra Part II.A.
35. See infra Part II.B.
36. See, e.g., FDIC v. Int'l Prop. Mgmt., 929 F.2d 1033, 1038 (5th Cir. 1991) (applying
Texas law); Equitable Mortgage Co. v. Fishman (In re Charles D. Stapp of Nev., Inc.), 641 F.2d
737, 740 (9th Cir. 1981) (applying Nevada law); Fid. Bankers Life Ins. Co. v. Williams (In re
O'Neill Euters, Inc.), 506 F.2d 1242, 1243-44 (4th Cir. 1974) (applying Virginia law); First Fid.
Bank, N.A. v. Eleven Hundred Metroplex Assocs., 190 B.R. 510,511-12 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1995);
First Fed. Sav. of Ark. v. City Nat'l Bank of Fort Smith, Ark., 87 B.R. 565, 567-68 (Bankr. W.D.
Ark. 1988); In re Kingsport Ventures, L.P., 251 B.R. 841, 846 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 2000) (citing
Am. Trust & Banking Co. v. Twinam, 216 S.W.2d 314,319 (Tenn. 1948)); Robin Assocs. v. Metro.
Bank & Trust Co. (In re Robin Assocs.), 275 B.R. 218, 221 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 2001); In re Carter,
126 B.R. 811, 813 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1991); In re Galvin, 120 B.R. 767, 771-72 (Bankr. D. Vt.
1990); In re Gould, 78 B.R. 590, 592 (Bankr. D. Idaho 1987); In re P.M.G. Props., 55 B.R. 864,
869 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1985); HomeCorp v. Secor Bank, 659 So. 2d 15, 20 (Ala. 1994); Vector
Realty Group, Inc. v. 711 Fourteenth St., Inc., 711 A.2d 1265, 1267 (D.C. 1998); Haw. Nat'l Bank
v. Cook, 58 P.3d 60,68 (Haw. 2002); MetLife Capital Fin. Corp. v. Wash. Ave. Assocs. L.P., 732
A.2d 493, 503 (N.J. 1999); 801 Nolana, Inc. v. RTC Mortgage Trust 1994-S6, 994 S.W.2d 751,
754-56 (Tex. App. 1997).
In some states the absolute assignment is treated as creating a security interest, albeit a different
type of security interest from a collateral assignment, and other courts treat an absolute assignment
of rents as a transfer to the lender of the borrower's interest in the rents. See infra Part IV.A.
37. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 2938(a) (West 2006); In re Century Inv. Fund VIII Ltd.
P'ship., 937 F.2d 371, 377 (7th Cir. 1991) (applying Wisconsin law); Drummond v. Farm Credit
Bank of Spokane (In re Kurth Ranch), 110 B.R. 501, 506 (Bankr. D. Mont. 1990).
38. See infra Part 11.
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the trustee in bankruptcy."39 Under Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial
Code (UCC), the method of perfection is determined by the type of
collateral, but the more common means of perfection include filing a
financing statement or taking possession of the 41
collateral.4" Both filing and
possession give notice of the security interest.
The term "perfection" is not typically used with respect to security
interests in real property, but comparable concepts exist. A creditor with
a lien on real property gets maximum protection against third parties and
obtains priority over other creditors by recording the lien in the real
property records.42 Recordation in the context of real property, like
perfection in the context of Article 9, is a step that is designed to give
notice to third parties of the creditor's interest in the property.
Perfection of assignments of rents has caused a great deal of confusion.
Under the traditional common law approach, a collateral assignment of
' lien that is not perfected until
rents creates what is called an "inchoate"43
the lender takes whatever action is required to enforce the assignment of
rents.' Several states 45 and a number of federal courts interpreting state
law46 still follow this approach. To make matters worse for lenders, states
that follow the common law approach to perfection may also require

39. JAMES J. WHITE& ROBERTS. SUMMERS, UNIFORM COMMERCIALCODE § 22-1, at 748 (5th
ed. 2000).
40. See id. § 22-4, at 757-58.
41. See id.
42. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: MORTGAGES § 4.2 cmt. b (1997).

43. "Inchoate" means "[p]artially completed or imperfectly formed; just begun." BLACK'S
LAW DICTIONARY 776 (8th ed. 2004).

44. See O'Neal Steel, Inc. v. E B Inc. (In re Millette), 186 F.3d 638, 641 (5th Cir. 1999).
45. See, e.g., Bevins v. Peoples Bank & Trust Co., 671 P.2d 875, 879 (Alaska 1983);
Martinez v. Cont'l Enters., 730 P.2d 308, 316 (Colo. 1986) (en banc); Taylor v. Brennan, 621
S.W.2d 592, 594 (Tex. 1981).
46. See O'NealSteel, 186 F.3d at 641 n.6 (citing In re Century Inv. Fund VIII L.P., 937 F.2d
371, 377 (7th Cir. 1991) (applying Wisconsin law); In re 1301 Conn. Ave. Assocs., 126 B.R. 1, 3
(Bankr. D.D.C. 1991) (applying D.C. law); First Fed. Say. & Loan Assoc. of Toledo v. Hunter (In
re Sam A. Tisci, Inc.), 133 B.R. 857, 859 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1991) (applying Ohio law); Condor
One, Inc. v. Turtle Creek, Ltd. (In re Turtle Creek, Ltd.), 194 B.R. 267, 278 (Bankr. N.D. Ala.
1996) (applying Alabama law); In re Mews Assocs., L.P., 144 B.R. 867, 868-69 (Bankr. W.D. Mo.
1992) (applying Missouri law); Drummond v. Farm Credit Bank of Spokane (In re Kurth Ranch),
110 B.R. 501, 506 (Bankr. D. Mont. 1990) (applying Montana law); Armstrong v. United States
(In re Neideffer), 96 B.R. 241, 243 (Bankr. D.N.D. 1988) (applying North Dakota law); Ziegler v.
First Nat'l Bank of Volga (In re Ziegler), 65 B.R. 285, 287 (Bankr. D.S.D. 1986) (applying South
Dakota law)). But cf.Vienna Park Props. v. United Postal Sav. Ass'n (In re Vienna Park Props.),
976 F.2d 106, 112-13 (2d Cir. 1992) (holding security interest in rents was inchoate under Virginia
law but nevertheless perfected); In re Park at Dash Point L.P., 121 B.R. 850, 855 (Bankr. W.D.
Wash. 1990) (holding security interest inchoate but perfected), affd sub nom. Steinberg v.
Crossland Mortgage Corp. (In re Park at Dash Point L.P.), 152 B.R. 300 (Bankr. W.D. Wash.
1991), aftd,985 F.2d 1008 (9th Cir. 1993).
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burdensome action for enforcement.47 Therefore, the lender does not have
a perfected security interest in rents until the lender takes possession of the
property or takes some other burdensome action such as obtaining the
appointment of a receiver.4 " Typical of this troublesome approach is Taylor
v. Brennan, in which the Texas Supreme Court held that a collateral
assignment of rents is inchoate and "does not become operative until the
mortgagee obtains possession of the property, or impounds the rents, or
secures the appointment of a receiver, or takes some other similar
action."49
Most states, whether by statute5 ° or judicial decision,5 have now
adopted the modem approach that perfection of an assignment of rents is
accomplished by recordation. Perfection in these states, therefore, is
analogous to perfection under Article 9 of the U.C.C. and perfection of a
mortgage lien. Filing a financing statement or recording an instrument in
the real property records is the step by a lender that gives notice to the
world of the security interest or lien. Similarly, recording an assignment of
rents in the real property records gives notice of the security interest in
rents and thus perfects the security interest.
Nevertheless, in a significant minority of states, a recorded collateral
assignment of rents is not treated as perfected until the lender takes steps
to enforce the security interest. 52 As a result, in a priority contest between
a mortgage lender with a recorded but unenforced assignment of rents and
ajudgment lien creditor who has served a writ of garnishment on rents, the
judgment lien creditor will win.53 The Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit, in criticizing the common law approach stated: "This leads to a
bizarre result: A mortgagee, which has done all it could to secure its
interest in the rents, loses priority to a judgment creditor who had
constructive knowledge by the recordation of the mortgagee's assignment
of rents."5 " This result defeats the public policy concerns underlying

47. See infra Part II.B for a discussion of permitted methods of enforcement.
48. See Taylor, 621 S.W.2d at 594.
49. Id. The court has not elaborated on what "other similar action" might include.
50. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 2938(b) (West 2006); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 25, § 2121(a)
(2006); FLA. STAT. § 697.07(2) (2006); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 58-2343(b) (2006); MD. CODE ANN.,
REAL PROP. § 3-204 (West 2006); NEB. REV. STAT. § 52-1704 (2006); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 47-20(c)
(2006); TENN. CODE ANN. § 66-26-116(a) (2006); VA. CODE ANN. § 55-220.1 (2006); WASH. REV.
CODE § 7.28.230(3) (2006).
51. See, e.g., 0 'NealSteel, 186 F.3d at 642 n.7 (citing Travelers Ins. Co. v. First Nat'l Bank
of Blue Island, 621 N.E.2d 209,214-15 (Ill. App. Ct. 1993); Teachers Ins. & Annuity Ass'n of Am.
v. Okla. Tower Assocs. L.P., 798 P.2d 618, 622 (Okla. 1990)).
52. See supra notes 45-46 and accompanying text.
53. See, e.g., O'Neal Steel, 186 F.3d at 642.
54. Id.
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recording acts.55
Before the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1994,56 the confusion over
perfection of assignments of rents created havoc in the bankruptcy courts.57
The Bankruptcy Code gives a trustee in bankruptcy, as well as a debtor in
possession, the power to avoid transfers to the same extent as a bona fide
purchaser of real property from the debtor or a lien creditor of the debtor.58
Therefore, the trustee or debtor in possession can avoid an unrecorded
transfer of an interest in real property or an unperfected security interest.
In bankruptcy cases, courts look to state law to determine the extent of
property rights, including a mortgage lender's rights to rents. 9 Thus,
depending on state law or a federal court's interpretation of state law,
courts in bankruptcy cases adopted different approaches to the issue of
whether the trustee or debtor in possession could avoid a mortgage lender's
assignment of rents that was recorded but not yet enforced.6 ° Some courts
determined that the trustee could avoid the lender's interest in rents if state
law required enforcement for perfection.61 Other courts permitted the

55. See id.
56. Pub. L. No. 103-394, 108 Stat. 4106 (1994) (codified as amended in scattered sections
of 11 U.S.C.).
57. See Forrester,supranote 2, at 354-55 n.21 ("The author found more than 300 bankruptcy
cases reported from 1980 to [1993] involving the issue of rents.").
58. See 11 U.S.C. § 544(a) (2000).
59. See Butner v. United States, 440 U.S. 48, 54-55 (1979). In Butner, the U.S. Supreme
Court said,
Property interests are created and defined by state law. Unless some federal
interest requires a different result, there is no reason why such interests should be
analyzed differently simply because an interested party is involved in a bankruptcy
proceeding. Uniform treatment of property interests by both state and federal
courts within a State serves to reduce uncertainty, to discourage forum shopping,
and to prevent a party from receiving "a windfall merely by reason of the
happenstance ofbankruptcy." The justifications for application of state law are not
limited to ownership interests; they apply with equal force to security interests,
including the interest of a mortgagee in rents earned by mortgaged property.
Id. at 55 (quoting Lewis v. Mfrs. Nat'l Bank, 364 U.S. 603, 609 (1961)). The Court has continued
to follow its mandate set forth in Butner under the current Bankruptcy Code. See Raleigh v. Ill.
Dep't of Revenue, 530 U.S. 15, 20 (2000); Nobelman v. Am. Sav. Bank, 508 U.S. 324, 329 (1993).
60. See Forrester, supranote 2, at 386-92.
61. See, e.g., Glessner v. Union Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. (In re Glessner), 140 B.R. 556, 561
(Bankr. D. Kan. 1992), supersededby statute, KAN. STAT. ANN. § 58-2343 (2005); Drummond v.
Farm Credit Bank (In re Kurth Ranch), 110 B.R. 501, 506 (Bankr. D. Mont. 1990); In re MultiGroup III Ltd. P'ship, 99 B.R. 5, 10 (Bankr. D. Ariz. 1989); In re TM Carlton House Partners, Ltd.,
91 B.R. 349, 357 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1988); In re Ass'n Ctr. Ltd. P'ship, 87 B.R. 142, 147 (Bankr.
W.D. Wash. 1988), supersededby statute,WASH. REV. CODE § 7.28.230(3) (2006); In re Hamlin's
Landing Joint Venture, 77 B.R. 916, 919-20 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1987), supersededby statute,FLA.
STAT. § 697.07 (2006); Exch. Nat'l Bank v. Gotta (In re Gotta), 47 B.R. 198, 203 (Bankr. W.D.
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lender to perfect the assignment of rents by filing a notice in the
bankruptcy court, even if it was treated as unperfected under state law
before the bankruptcy filing.62 A third group of courts found that a properly
recorded assignment of rents was perfected and thus would not permit the
trustee to avoid the lender's interest in rents.63
Congress addressed this issue in the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1994'
by amending § 552(b) of the Bankruptcy Code.6 5 According to the

Wis. 1985).
62. See, e.g., Casbeer v. State Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n of Lubbock (In re Casbeer), 793 F.2d
1436, 1443 (5th Cir. 1986); Wolters Viii., Ltd. v. Vill. Props., Ltd. (In re Vill. Props., Ltd.), 723
F.2d 441, 446-47 (5th Cir. 1984); Consol. Capital Income Trust v. Colter, Inc. (In re Consol.
Capital Income Trust), 47 B.R. 1008, 1011 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1985); McCombs Props. VI, Ltd. v.
First Tex. Sav. Ass'n (In re McCombs Props. VI, Ltd.), 88 B.R. 261,264 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1988);
In re Mears, 88 B.R. 419, 421 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1988); In re Gelwicks, 81 B.R. 445,448 (Bankr.
N.D. 111.1987); FDIC v. Lancaster (In re Sampson), 57 BR. 304, 307 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1986);
United States v. Farrell (In re Fluge), 57 B.R. 451, 454 (Bankr. D.N.D. 1985).
63. See, e.g., Steinberg v. Crossland Mortgage Corp. (In re Park at Dash Point L.P.), 985
F.2d 1008, 1011 (9th Cir. 1993); Vienna Park Props. v. United Postal Sav. Ass'n (In re Vienna
Park Props.), 976 F.2d 106, 112-13 (2d Cir. 1992); J.H. Streiker & Co. v. SeSide Co. (In re SeSide
Co.), 152 B.R. 878, 885 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1993); Nw. Nat'l Life Ins. Co. v. Metro Square (In re
Metro Square), 106 B.R. 584, 588 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1989); In re Northport Marina Assocs., 136
B.R. 911, 919 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1992); In re White Plains Dev. Corp., 136 B.R. 93, 95 (Bankr.
S.D.N.Y. 1992); In re Rancourt, 123 B.R. 143,147 (Bankr. D.N.H. 1991); In re Somero, 122 B.R.
634, 638-39 (Bankr. D. Me. 1991); In re Raleigh/Spring Forest Apartments Assocs., 118 B.R. 42,
45 (Bankr. E.D.N.C. 1990).
64. Pub. L. No. 103-394, 108 Stat. 4106 (1994) (codified as amended in scattered sections
of 11 U.S.C.).
65. 11 U.S.C.A. § 552(b)(2) (West 2007). Section 552(b)(2) now reads:
Except as provided in sections 363, 506(c), 522, 544, 545, 547, and 548 of this
title, and notwithstanding section 546(b) of this title, if the debtor and an entity
entered into a security agreement before the commencement of the case and if the
security interest created by such security agreement extends to property of the
debtor acquired before the commencement of the case and to amounts paid as rents
of such property or the fees, charges, accounts, or other payments for the use or
occupancy of rooms and other public facilities in hotels, motels, or other lodging
properties, then such security interest extends to such rents and such fees, charges,
accounts, or other payments acquired by the estate after the commencement of the
case to the extent provided in such security agreement, except to any extent that
the court, after notice and a hearing and based on the equities of the case, orders
otherwise.
Id. The Act deleted "and by applicable nonbankruptcy law" after "security agreement" and added
"and notwithstanding section 546(b) of this title" as shown above. The Act also rephrased
"proceeds, product, offspring, rents, or profits of such property" to read "amounts paid as rents of
such property or the fees, charges, accounts, or other payments for the use or occupancy of rooms
and other public facilities in hotels, motels, or other lodging properties." Pub. L. No. 103-394,
§ 214(a), 108 Stat. 4106, 4126 (1994) (codified as amended at 11 U.S.C.A. § 552(b)).
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legislative history of the Act, the amendment "provides that lenders may
have valid security interests in post-petition rents for bankruptcy purposes
notwithstanding their failure to have fully perfected their security interest
under applicable state law., 66 Thus, according to this legislative history, a
bankruptcy trustee or debtor in possession should no longer be able to
avoid properly recorded assignments of rents. Some commentators have
disputed the effectiveness of the language of the current § 522(b)(2) to
resolve the perfection problem in bankruptcy, 67 but the spate of litigation
over this issue has subsided.
Under the law in a number of states, the perfection problem for a
collateral assignment of rents persists. A solution, however, that lenders
have found to the perfection problem is the absolute assignment of rents.
An absolute assignment does not create an inchoate lien on rents and is
effective upon default. 68 Therefore, even in those states that have equated
perfection with enforcement for a collateral assignment of rents, courts
have held that an absolute assignment does not require additional action by
the lender in order to be perfected.69 Consequently, lenders have an
incentive to require an absolute assignment of rents rather than a collateral
assignment in those states that retain the traditional common law approach
to perfection. In other states, issues over enforcement may create that
incentive.
B. The Enforcement Problem
The method by which a collateral assignment of rents may be enforced
varies from state to state. In some states, a lender may enforce a collateral
assignment of rents by taking some nominal action, such as making
demand on the borrower7 ° or the tenants.71 Other states may require

66. 140 CONG. REc. H10752-01 (daily ed. Oct. 4, 1994) (statement of Rep. Brooks).
67. See Carlson, supra note 7, at 1145; Freyermuth, The New UARA, supra note 7, at 28;
Marvin E. Jacob et al., An Analysis of the Provisions of the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1994
Relating to Cases Administered Under Chapter 11, 4 J. BANKR. L. & PRAc 339, 370-73 (1995).
A Texas bankruptcy court recently discussed the issue of perfection of a security interest in rents
in the bankruptcy context without referring to the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1994 (the 1994 Act).
See In re Allen, 357 B.R. 103, 110 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2006). The court cited and discussed pre-1994
Act cases as being authoritative with respect to the perfection issue. Id.The case cannot, however,
be taken as holding that the 1994 Act did not resolve the perfection issue in bankruptcy because the
court failed to even discuss the Act.
68. See O'Neal Steel, Inc. v. E B Inc. (In re Millett), 186 F.3d 638, 643 (5th Cir. 1999).
69. See, e.g., id.; Geary's Bottled Liquors Co. v. Independence One Fin. Servs. (In re Geary's
Bottled Liquors Co.), 184 B.R. 408, 413 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1995).
70. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 2938(c)(4) (West 2006); United States v. Farrell (In re
Fluge), 57 B.R. 451, 454 (Bankr. D.N.D. 1985); Bevins v. Peoples Bank & Trust Co., 671 P.2d
875, 879 (Alaska 1983); Haw. Nat'l Bank v. Cook, 58 P.3d 60, 67-68 (Haw. 2002).
71. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 2938(c)(3); Imperial Gardens Liquidating Trust v. Nw.
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somewhat more onerous action, such as filing a request for a receiver 2 or
initiating a foreclosure proceeding.73 To enforce a collateral assignment of
rents in many states, however, the lender must take possession of the
mortgaged property or take some action, such as obtaining the appointment
of a receiver, that is considered the equivalent of taking possession of the
property."
Requiring a lender to take possession of mortgaged property or obtain
the appointment of a receiver in order to enforce a collateral assignment of
rents is a significant disadvantage to lenders. A lender must go to court to
obtain the appointment of a receiver,75 and obtaining possession of the
mortgaged property requires judicial intervention as well, unless the
borrower is willing to relinquish possession of the property voluntarily.76
The delay can give a borrower time to collect and misapply rents.77 In
addition, when a lender becomes a mortgagee-in-possession, the lender
faces potential liability that can exceed the amount of the mortgage debt.
First, a lender in possession might face liability for environmental
problems on the property.78 Second, the lender can be held liable to the
Commons, Inc. (In reNw. Commons, Inc.), 136 B.R. 215,218 (Bankr. E.D. Mo. 1991), criticized
in In re Mews Assocs., L.P., 144 B.R. 867, 868 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1992); Fluge, 57 B.R. at 454;
Haw. Nat'l Bank, 58 P.3d at 67-68.
72. See, e.g., In re Century Inv. Fund VIII Ltd. P'ship, 937 F.2d 371, 378 (7th Cir. 1991);
In re Flower City Nursing Home, Inc., 38 B.R. 642, 645 (Bankr. W.D.N.Y. 1984).
73. See, e.g., Martinez v. Cont'l Enters., 730 P.2d 308, 316 (Colo. 1986).
74. See, e.g., Freedman's Sav. & Trust Co. v. Shepherd, 127 U.S. 494, 502-03 (1888)
(requiring that the lender take actual possession, that a receiver take possession, or that the lender's
demand for possession be refused); In re Park at Dash Point L.P., 121 B.R. 850, 856 (Bankr. W.D.
Wash. 1990) (requiring the lender to obtain possession either directly or through a receiver), aff'd
sub nom. Steinberg v. Crossland Mortgage Corp. (In re Park at Dash Point L.P.), 152 B.R. 300
(Bankr. W.D. Wash 1991), aff'd, 985 F.2d 1008 (9th Cir. 1993); Taylor v. Brennan, 621 S.W.2d
592, 594 (Tex. 1981) (requiring the lender to obtain possession, impound the rents, secure
appointment of a receiver, or take some similar action).
75. See Fed. Home Loan Mortgage Corp. v. Spark Tarrytown, Inc., 829 F. Supp. 82, 85
(S.D.N.Y. 1993).
76. Although the mortgagee-in-possession remedy is designed to take effect withoutjudicial
intervention, a lender may not use force to dispossess a borrower who refuses to give up possession
of the mortgaged property.
77. A lender with a collateral assignment of rents cannot reach rents collected by the borrower
during this period. See infra Part II.C.
78. The Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act
(CERCLA), 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 9601-9675 (West 2007), imposes liability upon owners and operators
of hazardous waste sites. Id. § 9607(a). "Owner or operator" does not include "a lender that,
without participating in the management of a... facility, holds indicia of ownership primarily to
protect the security interest . . . in the . . . facility." Id § 9601(20)(E). CERCLA defines
participation in management as "actually participating in the management or operational affairs of
a... facility" and "does not include merely having the capacity to influence, or the unexercised
right to control.., facility operations." Id. § 9601(20)(F). The statute includes within the meaning
of the term the exercise of"decisionmaking control over the environmental compliance related to
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borrower for mismanagement if the lender fails to "manage the property
in a reasonably prudent and careful manner so as to keep it in a good state
of preservation and productivity. 7 9 A mortgagee-in-possession is held to
the standard of a "prudent" or "provident" owner.80 Finally, the lender
might be liable to third parties for injuries caused by dangerous conditions
on the property.8 For these reasons, lenders are generally hesitant to
become mortgagees-in-possession.82
the .. .facility" or the exercise of "control at a level comparable to that of a manager of
the ... facility" if the borrower remains in possession of the facility. Id. Therefore, a lender's
exercise of such control while in possession of the facility is probably within the scope of
"participation in management."
The statute provides a safe harbor for a lender after foreclosure if the lender is attempting to sell
-the property as prescribed by the statute, id.§ 9601(20)(F), but the rule provides no similar safe
harbor for a lender in possession prior to foreclosure. Therefore, a mortgagee-in-possession is likely
participating in the management of a facility and does not fit within the exemption from liability.
79. Myers-Macomber Eng'rs v. M.L.W. Constr. Corp., 414 A.2d 357, 360 (Pa. Super. Ct.
1979).
80. See United Nat'l Bank v. Parish, 750 A.2d 238, 241 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1999)
(quoting Essex Cleaning v. Amato, 317 A.2d 411, 412 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1974)); Koury
v. Sood, 62 A.2d 649, 653 (R.I. 1948); Bomar v. Smith, 195 S.W. 964, 980 (Tex. Civ. App. 1917);
Coleman v. Hoffman, 64 P.3d 65, 68 (Wash. Ct. App. 2003); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.:
MORTGAGES, § 4.1 cmt. c (1997).
81. See Daniels v. Hart, 118 Mass. 543,544 (1875); Barter & Co. v. Wheeler, 49 N.H. 9, 34
(1869); First Nat'l Bank v. Motor Club of Am. Ins. Co., 708 A.2d 69, 70 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.
1997); Rogers v. Wheeler, 43 N.Y. 598, 603-04 (1871); Zisman v. City of Duquesne, 18 A.2d 95,
97 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1941); Sprague v. Smith, 29 Vt. 421, 425-26 (1857); Coleman, 64 P.3d at 68;
NELSON & WHITMAN, supra note 21, § 4.26.
82. Even in states that permit enforcement of a collateral assignment of rents by less onerous
action than taking possession, courts may consider the required action to be the equivalent of taking
possession. See J.H. Streiker & Co. v. SeSide Co. (In re SeSide Co.), 152 B.R. 878, 883 (Bankr.
E.D. Pa. 1993) (classifying a lender's service of demand notices on tenants as taking constructive
possession); Imperial Gardens Liquidating Trust v. Nw. Commons, Inc. (In re Nw. Commons, Inc.),
136 B.R. 215, 218 (Bankr. E.D. Mo. 1991) (finding that a lender's notifications to tenants was
"equivalent to taking possession"), criticized in In re Mews Assocs., L.P., 144 B.R. 867, 868
(Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1992); Spiotta v. Nat'l Grocery Co., 168 A. 159, 160 (Hudson County Ct. 1933)
(finding constructive possession where lender had served notice on tenant demanding payment of
rent to lender). As a result, the lender could be treated as a mortgagee-in-possession with the
attendant risks and liabilities. See United Nat'l Bank v. Parish, 750 A.2d 238, 239-40 (N.J. Super.
Ct. Ch. Div. 1999) (treating a lender who collected rents pursuant to an assignment of rents as a
mortgagee-in-possession). However, most courts have held that simply collecting rents after making
demand on the borrower or tenants without otherwise taking control of the property does not make
a lender a mortgagee-in-possession. See, e.g., Prince v. Brown, 856 P.2d 589, 590 (Okla. Civ. App.
1993); Coleman, 64 P.3d at 69-70; NELSON & WHITMAN, supra note 21, § 4.25; see also Strutt v.
Ontario Say. & Loan Ass'n, 105 Cal. Rptr. 395, 405 (Ct. App. 1973) (finding that a lender "who,
after default, does no more than collect rents by means of a letter request to the tenants and who
does not undertake management of the property is [not] a 'mortgagee-in-possession"'); Luther P.
Stephens Inv.Co. v. Berry Schs., 3 S.E.2d 68, 71 (Ga. 1939) ("[T]he mere fact that the mortgagee
receives the rents and profits does not constitute him a mortgagee-in-possession, unless he takes
the rent in such a way as to take out of the hands of the mortgagor the management and control of
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There are also disadvantages to the receivership remedy. First, a lender
might find it difficult to make the necessary showing to a court that a
receiver should be appointed. In many states, the insolvency of the
borrower and inadequacy of the security are insufficient as the sole reasons
for a receivership. 3 Some additional equitable ground for the receivership,
"such as danger of loss, waste, destruction, or serious impairment of the
property," must exist.8 4 The effectiveness of a provision in loan documents
entitling a lender to the appointment of a receiver varies from jurisdiction
to jurisdiction. 5 If the lender does procure the appointment of a receiver,
fees paid to the receiver reduce funds available for payment of the
mortgage debt and a risk exists that the receiver will mismanage the
property.86 Finally, in states that permit non-judicial foreclosure, a lender
risks being deemed to have elected ajudicial foreclosure by going to court
to obtain the appointment of a receiver.8 7 Therefore, receivership may be
undesirable to lenders as a means to control rents.
The absolute assignment of rents has provided a solution for lenders to
the enforcement problem for collateral assignments of rents. An absolute
assignment of rents gives the lender the right to collect rents automatically
upon default.88 Therefore, the lender can take control of rents upon default

the estate."); Ireland v. U.S. Mortgage & Trust Co., 76 N.Y.S. 177, 182 (N.Y. App. Div. 1902)
(finding that a lender's receipt of rents does not make the lender a mortgagee-in-possession), aff'd,
67 N.E. 1083 (1903).
83. See, e.g., Grether v. Nick, 213 N.W. 304, 306 (Wis. 1927).
84. Id.; see also Totten v. Harlowe, 90 F.2d 377, 380 (D.C. Cir. 1937); Atco Constr. & Dev.
Corp. v. Beneficial Say. Bank, F.S.B., 523 So. 2d 747, 750 (Fla. 5th DCA 1988); First Nat'l Bank
of Joliet v. Ill. Steel Co., 51 N.E. 200, 202 (Ill. 1898); Crowley v. Valley W. Water Co., 882 P.2d
1022, 1026 (Mont. 1994); Cortleyeu v. Hathaway, 11 N.J. Eq. 39,43 (N.J. Ch. 1855). See generally
NELSON & WHITMAN, supranote 21, § 4.34 (discussing the basis for appointment of a receiver in
title and lien jurisdictions).
85. The presence of a receivership clause in the mortgage has virtually no effect in some
states. See, e.g., Gage v. First Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n of Hutchinson, Kan., 717 F. Supp. 745,
750-51 (D. Kan. 1989); Dart v. W. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 438 P.2d 407, 410-11 (Ariz. 1968); ANJ
Future Invs., Inc. v. Alter, 756 So. 2d 153, 154 (Fla. 3d DCA 2000) (quoting Seasons P'ship I v.
Kraus-Anderson, Inc., 700 So. 2d 60, 61 (Fla. 2d DCA 1997); Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Broecker, 77
N.E. 1092, 1092 (Ind. 1906); Hazeltine v. Granger, 7 N.W. 74, 75 (Mich. 1880). In other states,
such a clause is helpful, but not conclusive, on the issue. See Barclays Bank of Cal. v. Superior
Court, 137 Cal. Rptr. 743, 748 (Ct. App. 1977); Fleet Bank v. Zimelman, 575 A.2d 731, 734 (Me.
1990); Riverside Props. v. Teachers Ins. & Annuity Ass'n, 590 S.W.2d 736, 738 (Tex. Civ. App.
1979). Finally, in a few states, such a clause is enforceable by a lender without the necessity for a
showing of any of the ordinary grounds for the appointment of a receiver. See MINN. STAT.
§ 559.17 (2006); Febbraro v. Febbraro, 416 N.Y.S.2d 59, 60 (N.Y. App. Div. 1979).
86. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: MORTGAGES § 4.3 cmt. e (1997).
87. See First S. Props., Inc. v. Vallone, 533 S.W.2d 339, 341-42 (Tex. 1976).
88. See, e.g., Equitable Mortgage Co. v. Fishman (In re Charles D. Stapp, ofNev., Inc.), 641
F.2d 737, 740 (9th Cir. 1981); Vector Realty Group, Inc. v. 711 Fourteenth St., Inc., 711 A.2d
1265, 1267 (D.C. 1998); Haw. Nat'l Bank v. Cook, 58 P.3d 60,67 (Haw. 2002); MetLife Capital
Fin. Corp. v. Wash. Ave. Assocs. L.P., 732 A.2d 493, 503 (N.J. 1999); Taylor v. Brennan, 621
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without taking any burdensome action.
C. The Right to Previously CollectedRents
Another problem with the collateral assignment of rents from a lender's
perspective is that the lender cannot reach rents collected by the borrower
after default. Rents collected by the borrower are severed from the realty,
and the lender's interest in rents under a collateral assignment of rents does
not extend to these personal property "proceeds" of rents. 89 An agreement
of the parties to the contrary is not effective. 90 The lender's inability to
reach rents collected by the borrower between default and the lender's
exercise of its rights under a collateral assignment of rents is particularly
troublesome in those states where the lender must take some burdensome
action in order to begin collecting rents. Since the lender may not be able
to take possession of the property or obtain the appointment of a receiver
quickly, the borrower may be able to collect rents for several months and
misapply those rents without recourse by the lender.
An absolute assignment of rents, on the other hand, gives the lender the
right to rents collected by the borrower or other parties after default. 91
Therefore, the lender's inability to reach rents collected by the borrower
after default pursuant to a collateral assignment of rents gives the lender
S.W.2d 592, 594 (Tex. 1981).
89. In re Park at Dash Point L.P., 121 B.R. 850, 855 (Bankr. W.D. Wash. 1990), affidsub
nom. Steinberg v. Crossland Mortgage Corp. (In re Park at Dash Point L.P.) 152 B.R. 300 (W.D.
Wash 1991), aff'd, 985 F.2d 1008 (9th Cir. 1993). Even after default, a borrower has the right to
collect rents until the lender enforces its assignment of rents, and the lender has no rights
whatsoever to those rents collected by the borrower prior to enforcement. See Prudential Ins. Co.
v. Liberdar Holding Corp., 74 F.2d 50,51 (2d Cir. 1934); In re Parkat Dash PointL.P., 121 B.R.
at 855; In re Prichard Plaza Assocs. Ltd. P'ship, 84 B.R. 289, 297 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1988);
Martinez v. Cont'l Enters., 730 P.2d 308, 316 (Colo. 1986); Taylor, 621 S.W.2d at 594. But cf
Fed. Land Bank of Omaha v. Lower, 421 N.W.2d 126, 129 (Iowa 1988) (holding that a lender with
a valid lien on rents created by chattel mortgage was entitled to an accounting from the borrower
for rents collected by the borrower during the period between entry of a foreclosure decree and
request by the lender for appointment of a receiver).
90. See, e.g., Glessner v. Union Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. (In re Glessner), 140 B.R. 556, 561
(Bankr. D. Kan. 1992) ("Reason and authority lead us to the conclusion that the mortgagee is not
entitled to the benefits of the contract for the rents and profits of the land until he has, by
appropriate proceedings through the courts, taken the possession and control of such rents and
profits.") (quoting Hall v. Goldsworthy, 14 P.2d 659,661 (Kan. 1932)); Drummond v. Farm Credit
Bank of Spokane (In re Kurth Ranch), 110 B.R. 501,506 (Bankr. D. Mont. 1990) ("[I]n Montana,
a mortgagee may secure a security interest in the rents from the mortgaged property only by
appointment of a receiver, even though.., the mortgage instrument contains an assignment of rent
provision upon default.").
91. See FDIC v. Int'l Prop. Mgmt., Inc., 929 F.2d 1033,1035 (5th Cir. 1991); Fid. Bankers
Life Ins. Co. v. Williams (In re O'Neill Enters., Inc.), 506 F.2d 1242, 1244 (4th Cir. 1974); Great
W. Life Assurance Co. v. Rothman (In re Ventura-Louise Props.), 490 F.2d 1141, 1145 (9th Cir.
1974).
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another incentive to require an absolute assignment of rents.
The absolute assignment of rents is not a recent development.
Borrowers, lenders, and courts have struggled with the problems related to
assignments of rents for many years. Lenders have attempted to solve these
problems by using the absolute assignment of rents for more than a
century.
Elf.

HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE ABSOLUTE
ASSIGNMENT OF RENTS

The use of rents as additional security for a mortgage loan was
recognized very early in American law. John Powell acknowledged in his
1807 mortgage law treatise that "rents ...may be made the subject of a
mortgage."92 The earliest known corporate deed of trust, dated March 29,
1830, had a clause that allowed the trustee, upon the occurrence of a
default, to enter and take possession of the property, and to collect rents
and profits therefrom.93 The problem for both nineteenth-century and
modem-day attorneys was drafting language that would create a security
interest in rents that could be enforced in accordance with the intent of the
parties.
Many early cases acknowledge the right of a mortgage lender pursuant
to a "pledge" of rents to collect rents after taking possession of the
property, obtaining the appointment of a receiver, or some similar action
such as demanding and being refused possession.94 More difficult to find
are early cases recognizing the ability of a lender to collect rents upon
default without taking possession or some equivalent action. In many of
the early cases, the parties agreed that the lender must take possession or
equivalent action in order to collect rents; therefore, the right of the lender
to collect rents without taking possession was not at issue. In other cases,
there was no assignment of rents, but the granting clause of the mortgage
or deed of trust covered the real property together with rents and profits.95
In these cases, courts properly held that the mortgagor was entitled to the
rents until the lender took possession or obtained the appointment of a
receiver. In other cases, however, courts simply refused to give effect to
of the agreement giving the lender the right to rents upon
the language
96
default.
92. JOHN J. POWELL, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF MORTGAGES 25 (1 st Am. ed. 1811). The
first American edition was adapted from the fourth English edition.
93. See Israels & Kramer, supra note 7, at 488; James G. Smith, A ForgottenChapter in the
Early History of the CorporateTrust Deed, 61 AM. L. REv. 900, 904-05 (1927).
94. See Freedman's Sav. & Trust Co. v. Shepherd, 127 U.S. 494, 502 (1888); In re Banner,
149 F. 936, 939 (S.D.N.Y. 1907); Sullivan v. Rosson, 119 N.E. 405, 408 (N.Y. 1918).
95. See, e.g., Myers v. Brown, 112 A. 844, 845 (N.J. Ch. 1921).
96. See infra notes 124-36 and accompanying text.
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In some late-nineteenth and early-twentieth century cases, the parties
agreed that the lender could collect rents from the outset of the loan
without taking possession. 97 Typical of these cases is Harrisv. Taylor,9"
decided in 1898, in which a first mortgage lender was assigned "the sum
of $200 of the rents collected for each month." 99 A second lienholder had
sued for foreclosure and appointment of a receiver, and the first lienholder
was seeking to have rents paid over to him by the receiver.' 00 Holding for
the first lienholder, the court said that his assignment of rents "purports to
be an absolute, primary security for the debt, and was so treated prior to the
appointment of the receiver.""1 The court thus enforced the assignment of
rents in accordance with the agreement of the parties that the lender could
collect rents without taking possession of the mortgaged property.
Although courts gave effect to an agreement of the parties whereby the
lender could collect rents from the outset, what lenders often wanted was
the ability to collect rents upon default without taking possession. Courts
were then, as now, reluctant to find this type of agreement. In 1888 in
Freedman's Savings & Trust Co. v. Shepherd, °2 the U.S. Supreme Court
stated:

97. See Cargill v. Thompson, 59 N.W. 638, 639 (Minn. 1894); Harris v. Taylor, 54 N.Y.S.
864, 866 (N.Y. App. Div. 1898); see also Kelly v. Bowerman, 71 N.W. 836, 837 (Mich. 1897)
(involving a mortgagee who, through his brother, took possession at the time of execution of the
mortgage and holding that an "assignment of rents of mortgaged property, to be received by the
mortgagee and applied upon the mortgage, is valid"); Bank of Commerce & Trust Co. v. City of
Memphis, 290 S.W. 990, 991 (Tenn. 1927) (requiring borrower, pursuant to trust deed terms, to
keep rents on deposit in lender bank for application only to operation and maintenance of property
and payment of debt).
98. 54 N.Y.S. 864 (N.Y. App. Div. 1898).
99. Id. at 866.
100. Seeid. at 864.
101. Id. at 866-67.
102. 127 U.S. 494 (1888). Freedman'sSavings was decided long before Erie Railroad Co. v.
Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938), struck down Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. 1 (1842). Under Swift, federal
courts were not constrained by state court rulings in deciding issues of "general" commercial law
because state court decisions were merely evidence of the law, not law themselves. See Swift, 41
U.S. at 18. Swift was consistent with early-nineteenth century ideas that "the common law grew
from general principles of right and reason that existed independent ofjudicial decisions, and the
function of judges was to find, 'declare,' and apply the proper ones to each new fact situation."
Edward A. Purcell, Jr., The Story of Erie: How Litigants, Lawyers, Judges, Politics, and Social
Change Reshape the Law, in CiviL PROCEDURE STORIES 21, 24 (Kevin M. Clermont ed., 2004).
Under Swift, state court opinions regarding "rights and titles to things having a permanent locality,
such as the rights and titles to real estate" were laws that federal courts were required to respect.
Swift, 41 U.S. at 18. Thus, although property law was not included as part of the general common
law under Swift, a Supreme Court decision on a property law issue would nevertheless be influential
as "evidence of the law." Based on the number of subsequent opinions that have cited or quoted
Freedman'sSavings, it clearly was influential. See infra note 104.
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It is, of course, competent for the parties to provide in the
mortgage for the payment of rents and profits to the
mortgagee, even while the mortgagor remains in possession.
But when the mortgage contains no such provision, and even
where the income is expressly pledged as security for the
mortgage debt, with the right in the mortgagee to take
possession upon failure of the mortgagor to perform the
conditions of the mortgage, the general rule is that the
mortgagee is not entitled to the rents and profits of the
mortgaged premises until he takes actual possession, or until
possession is taken in his behalf by a receiver,.. . or until,
in
10 3
proper form, he demands, and is refused, possession.
Therefore, the Court recognized the enforceability of an agreement
between the parties that the lender collect rents upon default without taking
possession long before the term "absolute assignment" was used for that
purpose. However, the Court's distinction between an interest in rents that
can be enforced without taking possession and a "pledge of rents" may
have contributed to the use of the absolute assignment to create an interest
in rents that can be enforced without possession. This language from the
Freedman's Savings case has been cited or quoted in more than one
hundred cases"° and exerts a clear influence on the law governing
assignments of rents.
A few early courts simply gave effect to language in an assignment of
rents that the lender was entitled to rents upon default.'05 For example, in
Thomson v. Erskine,11 6 decided in 1901, a mortgage lender sued a tenant
for two months of rent that accrued after the borrower's default and notice
by the lender to the tenant.0 7 The assignment of rents "by its terms was to
become operative upon default. ' ' In holding for the lender, the court
stated, "We see no reason why a mortgagor may not, if he so desires, agree
with his mortgagee, and so stipulate in the bond, to assign the rents of the

103. Freedman'sSavings, 127 U.S. at 502-03.
104. A search conducted on Westlaw in September of2006 found 114 cases citingFreedman's
Savings on the issue of the treatment of rents in a mortgage loan.
105. See State Bank v. Cohen, 123 N.Y.S. 747, 748-49 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1910); Thomson v.
Erskine, 73 N.Y.S. 166, 166-67 (N.Y. App. Term 1901); Grannis-Blair Audit Co. v. Maddux, 69
S.W.2d 238, 238-39 (Tenn. 1934); Franzen v. G.R. Kinney Co., 259 N.W. 850, 852 (Wis. 1935);
see also Cullen v. Foote, 61 N.W. 818, 820 (Minn. 1895) (holding that a mortgage lender was
entitled to rent for payment of taxes and insurance after default despite a Minnesota statute that
prohibited a mortgagee from taking possession or collecting rents for other purposes); accordFid.Phila. Trust Co. v. West, 226 N.W. 406, 407-09 (Minn. 1929).
106. 73 N.Y.S. 166 (N.Y. App. Term 1901).
107. See id. at 166.
108. Id.
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mortgaged property in the event of his default."' 0 9 In Grannis-BlairAudit
Co. v. Maddux, l0 the court held that the right of a mortgage lender not in
possession of the property to rents pursuant to an assignment of rents
clause in the deed of trust was superior to the claim of a garnishor, stating:
The general rule . . . is that, so long as mortgagors are

permitted to remain in possession, they are entitled to the
rents, but, in view of the explicit provision in the trust
mortgage before us giving to the trustee the right to the rents
upon default in the payment of interest or principal of the
debt, upon making demand therefor, neither entry, nor
foreclosure proceedings, was a necessary prerequisite, this
agreement taking the case out of the general rule. 1 '
Most courts in the late-nineteenth century and early-twentieth century
would not give a lender rents accruing after default until the lender took
possession or obtained the appointment of a receiver. Courts sometimes
found that was the intent of the parties to the assignment of rents. For
example, in One Hundred Forty-Eight Realty Co. v. Conrad,"2 the
assignment of rents provided that "rents and profits are hereby, in the event
of any default.., pledged and assigned to the party of the second part...
with full power and authority to the said party of the second part to enter
upon and to take possession of the mortgaged premises.".. 3 The court
found that the clause required the lender to take possession in order to
collect rents. 1 4 In Simpson v. Ferguson,"5 the court stated:

109. Id.at 167. Several courts followed the decision in Thomson, including State Bank v.
Cohen, 123 N.Y.S. 747, 748-49 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1910), Sullivan v. Rosson, 151 N.Y.S. 613, 615
(N.Y. App. Div. 1915), rev 'd, 119 N.E. 405,408 (N.Y. 1918), and In reJarmulowsky,224 F. 141,
142-43 (S.D.N.Y. 1915) (following Sullivan v. Rosson, in an opinion written by then District Judge
Learned Hand). Sullivan v. Rosson, however, was reversed on appeal. Sullivan, 119 N.E. at 408;
see also infra notes 128-31 and accompanying text.
In a subsequent New York case, an assignment of rents upon default was again enforced
according to its terms. See Katz v. Goodman, 238 N.Y.S. 700, 701 (N.Y. App. Div. 1929). In Katz,
a borrower sought to evict a tenant who had paid rent to the mortgage lender after the lender had
The court said: "By the provisions of the mortgage,
demanded possession from the buyer. See id.
the rents were assigned and pledged to the mortgagee after default and the right of entry to collect
and apply the rents was given. The mortgagor in equity could not assert his own violation of his
agreement to prevent its enforcement." Id. at 702.
110. 69 S.W.2d 238 (Tenn. 1934).
111. Id.at 238-39. The California Supreme Court in Kinnison v. Guar. Liquidating Corp.,
discussed infra notes 149-50, cited Grannis-Blairas an "absolute assignment of rents" case.
Kinnison, 115 P.2d 450, 453 (Cal. 1941).
112. 210 N.Y.S. 400 (N.Y. App. Div. 1925).
113. Id. at401.
114. See id. at 405.
115. 44 P. 484 (Cal. 1896).
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Even if the rents and profits of the mortgaged property are
expressly pledged for the security of the mortgage debt, with
the right in the mortgagee to take possession upon default, the
mortgagee is not entitled to the rents and profits until he takes
actual possession,
or until possession is taken in his behalf by
16
a receiver."
Therefore, when the assignment of rents itself required the lender to take
possession, courts required the lender to take possession in order to collect
rents. However, even in cases in which the assignment of rents purported
to give the lender the right to rents upon default, a number of courts
required the lender to take possession or obtain the appointment of a
receiver in order to collect rents on the basis that the parties intended a
pledge rather than an absolute assignment of the rents." 7
The pledge was one of several common law security devices that were
for the most part superceded by Article 9 of the U.C.C." 8 A common law
pledge requires a debt, an offer of property as security for the debt, and
delivery of possession of the property from the pledgor to the pledgee." 9
The possession element is essential to make the pledge effective, 120 and
12
possession must continue in order for the pledge to remain in effect.'
Possession can be actual or constructive, such as the delivery of a key to
a warehouse holding the pledged property. 22 The possession requirement
of the common law pledge may be the source of the requirement that a
pledge of rents is not effective until the lender takes possession of the
mortgaged property or some similar action. It may also explain the
terminology used by courts that an assignment of rents is "inchoate" until
the lender takes possession of the mortgaged property or some similar

116. Id. at 484 (quoting LEONARD A. JONES, A TREATISE ONTHE LAW OFMORTGAGES OF REAL
PROPERTY § 670 (5th ed. 1894)).

117. See, e.g., In re Banner, 149 F. 936, 939 (S.D.N.Y. 1907); Sullivan v. Rosson, 119 N.E.
405,407-08 (N.Y. 1918).
118. See WHITE& SUMMERS, supranote 39, §§ 2 1-1(a), 21-2. Even after widespread adoption
of Article 9 of the UCC, the common law pledge continued to be used for certain purposes. For
example, lenders continued to take a common law pledge of collateral such as deposit accounts that
were not covered by earlier versions of Article 9. See U.C.C. § 9-104 (1) (1972); U.C.C. § 9-104(1)
(1978). Article 9 no longer excludes deposit accounts from its scope. See U.C.C. § 9-109 cmt. 16
(2000).
119. See Mechs.' & Traders' Ins. Co. v. Kiger, 103 U.S. 352, 356 (1880); Ala. Land &
Mineral Corp. v. Toffel, 292 F.3d 1319, 1325 (1lth Cir. 2002).
120. See Casey v. Cavaroc, 96 U.S. 467, 477 (1877); Toffel, 292 F.3d at 1326; Thurber v.
Oliver, 26 F. 224, 227 (C.C.D. Md. 1885).
121. See Casey, 96 U.S. at 477; Thurber, 26 F. at 227.
122. See Casey, 96 U.S. at 477.
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action, and thus explain the roots of the perfection problem.' 23
In order to avoid the possession requirement of a "pledge" of rents,
lenders attempted the "absolute assignment" argument very early. In
Armour Packing Co. v. Wolff & Co.,' 24 an assignment of rents stated that
the mortgagor did "hereby transfer, assign and make over" to the lender the
rents "as additionalsecurityfor the payment ofsaidnotes.', 25 The lender,
in an interpleader in a garnishment proceeding, claimed rents collected
prior to the lender's foreclosure on the basis that the assignment of rents
was an absolute assignment. 26 The court held it was not, stating: "Being
a mere security for the payment of money, the legal incidents to such
securities attach. One ofthese is that, until the mortgagee takes possession,
the mortgagor is entitled to the rents. '"127 In Sullivan v.Rosson, 28 rents
were "assigned to the holder of this mortgage as further security for the
payment of said indebtedness.' ' 29 The lender claimed that this language
made him the "unqualified owner of the rents.., to an amount sufficient
to pay said mortgage."' 3 ° The court held that the assignment of rents was
not an absolute transfer, but rather was a pledge of the rents as security for
the debt.' In re Banner'32 involved an assignment of rents clause in a
mortgage that provided, "And the said rents and profits are hereby, in the
event of any default... assigned to the holder of this mortgage."' 3 3 The
lender argued that the assignment clause gave the lender title to the rents
upon the occurrence of a default.'34 The court found that the language
created a pledge, distinguishing the earlier Harrisv. Taylor case'3 5 on the
basis that the assignment of rents in that case was in a separate
document.' 36
Lenders were eventually successful in making the "absolute
assignment" argument. 3 7 In Paramount Building and Loan Ass'n v.

123. See supranotes 43-44 and accompanying text.
124. 59 Mo. App. 665 (1894).
125. Id at 667.
126. See id.
127. Id at 668.
128. 119N.E. 405 (N.Y. 1918).
129. Id.at 406.
130. Id. at407.
131. See id.
132. 149 F. 936 (S.D.N.Y. 1907).
133. Id.at 937.
134. See id. at 938.
135. See supra notes 98-101 and accompanying text.
136. See Banner, 149 F. at 938-39.
137. See, e.g., Kinnison v. Guar. Liquidating Corp., 115 P.2d 450,453 (Cal. 1941); Paramount
Bldg. & Loan Ass'n of Newark v. Sacks, 152 A. 457, 458-59 (N.J. Ch. 1930); Stanton v. Metro.
Lumber Co., 152 A. 653, 654-55 (N.J. Ch. 1930). Some early cases did not necessarily use the
"absolute" assignment terminology but distinguished between a pledge and an assignment. See, e.g.,
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Sacks,3 8 three mortgagees claimed rents collected by a receiver after
default and before foreclosure by the first lienholder. 39
' The first lienholder
had an assignment of rents that by its terms became effective upon filing
a bill to foreclose; the second lienholder had an assignment of rents
effective upon default; and the third lienholder was in possession of the
property and collecting rents pursuant to his assignment of rents.140 The
court held that the second lienholder was entitled to rents that accrued after
default and before the first lienholder filed a bill of foreclosure. 14 1 The
142
court, citing Freedman's Saving and Trust Co. v. Shepherd,
distinguished between a pledge of the rents that would require possession
and an assignment of the rents.'43 In Stanton v. Metropolitan Lumber
Co.,'" decided about the same time as Paramount,another New Jersey
court held that an assignment of rents gave a mortgage lender the right to
rents accruing after default. 45 The court said: "The assignment, though
conditional, became absolute upon default of the mortgage debt, and was
valid and enforceable against the assignor .... As the rents accrued, after
the default, the ownership was in the assignee; the title was never in the
receiver and he, having collected them, is accountable."' 46
Courts could have simply decided to enforce an assignment of rents
effective upon default in accordance with the intent of the parties. Instead,
courts began focusing to a greater extent on whether the assignment was
an absolute assignment transferring title to the rents. For example, Judge
Augustus Hand, in Prudential Insurance Co. of America v. Liberdar
Holding Corp.,"'7 distinguished between an assignment for security and "a
transfer... of outright ownership.' 148 The California Supreme Court stated

Stanton,
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.

152 A. at 655.
152 A. 457 (N.J. Ch. 1930).
See id. at 457.
See id.
See id. at 459.
Freedman's Sav. & Trust Co. v. Shepherd, 127 U.S. 494 (1888).
Paramount,152 A. at 458 (citing Freedman's, 127 U.S. at 502-03).
152 A. 653 (N.J. Ch. 1930).
See id. at 654-55.
Id.
74 F.2d 50 (2d Cir. 1934).
Id. at 51. Judge Hand discussed the policy behind this distinction as follows:

It seems unlikely that mere words of assignment of future rents can entitle a
mortgagee to claim rentals which have been collected by a mortgagor and mingled
with its other property. Sound policy as well as every probable intention should
prevent a mortgagee from interfering with the mortgagor's possession until the
mortgagee takes steps to get the rentals within his control. To hold otherwise
would be to impose unworkable restrictions upon industry in cases where
mortgagors have been led to suppose that they might rightfully apply the rentals
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in the frequently cited case of Kinnison v. GuarantyLiquidatingCorp.:149
The agreement between the parties... may provide that in the
event of default the rents are assigned absolutely to the
mortgagee. It has been held that such a provision, rather than
pledging the rents as additional security, operates to transfer
to the mortgagee the mortgagor's right to the rentals upon the
happening of the specified condition.'50
This distinction is probably a result of the language of Justice Harlan's
opinion in Freedman'sSavings in which he acknowledged the ability of
the parties to agree that the lender would be entitled to rents without taking
possession but distinguished such an agreement from a "pledge" of the
rents.' 5 ' Regardless of the reasons for its development, the movement
towards the concept of the absolute assignment of rents was unfortunate
because it has caused confusion, has increased transaction costs and
litigation, and in some cases, has created injustice.
IV. CREATION AND CONSEQUENCES OF THE ABSOLUTE
ASSIGNMENT OF RENTS

A. Debatingthe Effect of the Absolute Assignment of Rents
A number of courts have stated that an absolute assignment of rents is
one which transfers "title" or "ownership" of the rents to the lender
contingent upon some future event such as default.'52 These courts treat the
absolute assignment of rents as a sale of the rental stream rather than as a
type of security interest because of the form and language of the document.
They are clearly elevating form over substance and have been routinely

to their own business.
Id.
149. 115 P.2d450 (Cal. 1941).
150. Id. at 453. Kinnison involved an assignment of rents that was executed by the borrower
after the borrower's default. See id. at 451. The agreement required the borrower to collect rents
for the account of the lender. See id. at 451-52.
151. See Freedman's Sav.& Trust Co. v. Shepherd, 127 U.S. 494, 502 (1888); see alsosupra
text accompanying note 103 (quoting Freedman's).
152. See, e.g., Great W. Life Assurance Co. v. Rothman (In re Ventura-Louise Props.), 490
F.2d 1141, 1144 (9th Cir. 1974) (stating that "by assignment, title is transferred" (quoting
Paramount Bldg. & Loan Ass'n ofNewark v. Sacks, 152 A. 457,458 (N.J. Ch. 1930))); In re Salem
Plaza Assocs., 135 B.R. 753, 756 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1992) (reasoning that absolute assignment,
"upon default, divests the [borrower] of every interest in the rents"); Taylor v. Brennan, 621 S.W.2d
592, 594 (Tex. 1981) (explaining that absolute assignment "passes title to the rents").
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criticized by commentators. 153
Other courts have acknowledged that an absolute assignment does in
fact create a security interest, albeit a different type of security interest
from a collateral assignment of rents. 54 For example, the Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit recognized that "[t]he concept of a present transfer of
title to rents contingent upon default, as opposed to a security interest in
rents, is essentially a legal fiction."' 55 An Illinois bankruptcy court made
the same point in a more humorous manner, stating, "[The lender] can call
this arrangement an 'absolute
assignment' or, more appropriately, 'Mickey
51 6
Mouse.' It's still a lien."'
The courts holding that an absolute assignment does in fact create a
type of security interest are correct because of the true substance of the
assignment of rents in the context of a mortgage loan. The substance of the
transaction is the creation of a security interest for a number of reasons.
First, an absolute assignment of rents is given in connection with (and only
because of) the related mortgage loan. Second, the borrower is typically
permitted to collect rents prior to default. Although the borrower may be
required to apply rents to pay for operation and maintenance of the
property and to pay debt service, the borrower's use of excess rents is not
restricted. Third, the lender is not entitled to collect rents until after a
default under the terms of the mortgage loan. Fourth, the rents that the

153. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: MORTGAGES § 4.2, cmt. a (1997); Averch et al.,
supra note 7, at 709; Carlson, supra note 7, at 1105-07; Forrester, supra note 2, at 379-81;
Freyermuth, The New UARA, supra note 7, at 29-35; Randolph, supra note 7, at 290.
154. See, e.g., FDIC v. Int'l Prop. Mgmt., Inc., 929 F.2d 1033, 1035 (5th Cir. 1991); 500
Ygnacio Assocs., Ltd. v. Aetna Life Ins. Co. (In re 500 Ygnacio Assocs., Ltd.), 141 B.R. 191,
195-96 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. 1992); In re Bethesda Air Rights Ltd. P'ship, 117 B.R. 202,206 (Bankr.
D. Md. 1990); Provident Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Winslow Ctr. Assocs. (In re Winslow Ctr. Assocs.),
50 B.R. 679,681 n.2 (Bankr. E.D. Penn. 1985); Nat'l Operating, L.P. v. Mut. Life Ins. Co. ofN.Y.,
630 N.W.2d 116, 131-32 (Wis. 2001).
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals characterized the absolute assignment as follows:
The assignment here is "absolute" in the sense that it was effective upon
default without further action by the creditor ....
Absolute" does not mean,
however, that the assignee is relieved of all obligation to account or that the right
to the rents is independent of the underlying debt. Upon foreclosure, the creditor,
of course, must account for any excess derived from the sale and rents collected
between the date of default and the date of foreclosure sale over and above the
amount of the obligation owed.
Equitable Mortgage Co. v. Fishman (In re Charles D. Stapp of Nev., Inc.), 641 F.2d 737, 740 (9th
Cir. 1981).
155. Int'l Prop.Mgmt., Inc., 929 F.2d at 1035 (citing Patrick A. Randolph, Jr., When Should
Bankruptcy Courts Recognize Lenders 'Rents Interests?, 23 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 833 (1990)).
156. Foundry ofBarrington P'ship v. Barrett (In re Foundry of Barrington P'ship), 129 B.R.
550, 557 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1991).
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lender collects must be applied to the indebtedness or for expenses related
to the mortgaged property. The lender cannot use rents to give its
stockholders a dividend, to give its employees a raise, or to redecorate its
offices. Fifth, the borrower retains the risk of nonpayment of rents by the
tenants. If a tenant fails to pay rent, the debt is not reduced. Finally, the
absolute assignment of rents terminates upon payment in full of the debt.
After the debt is paid, the "lien" on rents must be released, and the
borrower may collect them unencumbered by any obligation to the lender.
All of these factors point to the fact that the absolute assignment is in fact
a security interest.
Theoretically, a property owner could sell the right to collect rents from
the property to a mortgage lender. If the transaction were truly a sale of the
rents to the lender, the lender would give some consideration for the
purchase, such as a reduction in the debt by an amount equal to the present
value of the future rental stream. Instead, rents collected by a lender are
applied to the indebtedness only to the extent collected. If the lender
purchased the rental stream, the lender would begin collecting rents
immediately, and the lender would bear the risk of non-payment by
tenants. A true sale of57the rents would not terminate on the final repayment
of the indebtedness. 1
Other types of receivables are commonly sold. The business of
factoring involves the sale of accounts at a discount to a factor who then
collects the accounts.'58 The modem practice of asset securitization
involves the "true sale" of assets, such as mortgage loans, car loans, credit
card receivables, or other receivables to a special purpose vehicle (SPV)
that issues securities to investors.' 59 The transfer is structured as a "true
sale" in60 order to remove the assets from the originator's bankruptcy
estate.
Rents are typically not transferred in a "true sale" because the property
owner/landlord of necessity retains the landlord's obligation to perform
under the leases. Without the rental stream, a landlord would have little

157. Although unlikely, it is, of course, possible that a lender could purchase its borrower's
rents, reducing the indebtedness by an amount equal to the value of the rental stream and taking the
risk of collection ofthe rent and defaults by the tenants. Such a purchase would probably be of rents
under specific leases and would terminate when the terms of the assigned leases had expired rather
than when the borrower's indebtedness to the lender was repaid.
158. See WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 39, § 21-6. Traditionally, the factor purchased the
accounts on a non-recourse basis, meaning that the factor took the entire risk of collecting the
accounts. See id. Article 9 covers sales of accounts. U.C.C. § 9-109(a)(3) (2001).
159. See WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 39, § 21-6; Steven L. Schwarcz, The Alchemy of
Asset Securitization, 1 STAN. J.L. Bus. & FIN. 133, 135 (1994).
160. See Schwarcz, supra note 159, at 135-36. Some courts have incorrectly held that an
absolute assignment of rents removes the right to rents from the borrower's bankruptcy estate. See
infra Part IV.D.
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incentive to perform the landlord's duties under the leases. If the landlord
stops performing, the tenants are likely to stop paying rent. Thus, rents are
not a particularly desirable "receivable" for a prospective purchaser.
A mortgage lender, on the other hand, has every reason to want an
assignment of rents as an incident to its mortgage, and the lender has an
incentive to maintain the rental stream and the value of the real property
that is security for the mortgage loan. This transfer is not a transfer of title
at all, but is actually a transfer of a security interest. The superior treatment
of the "absolute assignment" type of security interest creates the lender's
incentive to couch its security interest in terms of an absolute assignment
rather than a collateral assignment. However, the confusion over the effect
of absolute assignments has created problems in their creation and their
treatment.
B. Creatingan Absolute Assignment of Rents
The uncertainty over whether an absolute assignment of rents creates
a security interest or transfers title to rents has made them difficult to
create. In most cases, courts have been reluctant to find that a borrower and
lender intended an absolute assignment and, therefore, have required the
parties to clearly express their intent to create an absolute assignment. 6 '
This presumption of a collateral assignment of rents is not warranted given
the sophisticated nature of parties to a commercial real estate loan secured
by an income-producing property. Nevertheless, the presumption persists.
Language in an assignment of rents requiring the lender to take some
action after default in order to collect rents may be fatal to the finding of
an absolute assignment.'62 Furthermore, if an assignment of rents provides
that it is given "as security" or "as additional security" for the mortgage
' This elevation
debt, courts will hold that it is not an absolute assignment. 63

161. See FDIC v. Int'l Prop. Mgmt., Inc., 929 F.2d 1033, 1036 (5th Cir. 1991); Prudential Ins.
Co. of Am. v. Liberdar Holding Corp., 74 F.2d 50, 51 (2d Cir. 1934); In re 5877 Poplar, L.P., 268
B.R. 140, 146 (Bankr. W.D. Tenn. 2001).
162. See, e.g., In re Allen, 357 B.R. 103, 112 (Bankr. S.D. Tex 2006); In re 1301 Conn. Ave.
Assocs., 117 B.R. 2,7 (Bankr. D.D.C. 1990), affd, 126 B.R. 1 (D.D.C. 1991); Taylor v. Brennan,
621 S.W.2d 592,594-95 (Tex. 1981); Cadle Co. v. Collin Creek Phase II Assocs., Ltd., 998 S.W.2d
718,723-24 (Tex. App. 1999); Schoenfelder v. American General Life Ins. Co., No. 05-0047,2006
WL 778719, at *4-5 (Iowa App. 2006) (Schechtman, J., dissenting).
163. See, e.g., In re 5877Poplar,L.P., 268 B.R. at 146-47; In re 1301 Conn. Ave. Assocs., 117
B.R. at 7-8; In re Ass'n Ctr. Ltd. P'ship, 87 B.R. 142, 145 (Bankr. W.D. Wash. 1988); Taylor, 621
S.W.2d at 594-95; Schoenfelder, 2006 WL 778719, at *5 (Schechtman, J., dissenting). But see In
re Carretta, 220 B.R. 203, 211-12 (D.N.J. 1998) (finding an absolute assignment despite language
in assignment of rents that it was given "[a]s further security"); In re Galvin, 120 B.R. 767, 771-72
(Bankr. D. Vt. 1990) (finding an absolute assignment based on intent of the parties despite language
in the assignment that it was given to secure the debt). In FDIC v. InternationalProperty
Management,Inc., the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit recognized that all assignments of
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of form over substance has created a drafting nightmare for lenders and
their attorneys attempting to secure a loan with an absolute assignment that
passes title to the rents upon default and is not "security" for the loan. This
difficulty has continued for more than a century and has caused a
substantial amount of litigation.
Armour Packing Co. v. Wolff and Co.,"6 decided in 1894, involved a
contest between a garnishor and a mortgagee over rents collected by the
garnishee after default in the mortgage and before the foreclosure sale.' 65
An assignment of rents executed after the mortgage provided that the
mortgagor did "hereby transfer, assign and make over to said company (the
mortgagee) any and all rents.., as additionalsecurityfor the payment of
saidnotes."'66 The mortgagee argued that he was entitled to rents because
the assignment was an absolute assignment.'67 The court rejected this
argument based on of the "security" language in the assignment, and
stated, "[b]eing a mere security for the payment of money, the legal
incidents to such securities attach. One of these is that, until the mortgagee
takes possession, the mortgagor is entitled to the rents.' 68
Through the twentieth century and into the twenty-first, courts have
continued to struggle with these same issues. 169 In Condor One, Inc. v.
Turtle Creek, Ltd.,'170 decided in 1996, an assignment of rents provided
"[t]hat all rents, profits and income from the property covered by this
Mortgage are hereby assigned to the Mortgagee for the purpose of
discharging the debt hereby secured.' 17' The lender argued that the
assignment of rents was absolute, but the court held that it was intended
only as security based on the language in the document. 172 In 2001, a
Tennessee bankruptcy court considered an assignment of rents that stated,
"As part of the consideration for the indebtedness secured hereby,
Borrowerhereby absolutely and unconditionallyassigns and transfersto
Lender and grants to the Lender a security interest in any and all
leases... with all the security deposits, rents... issues, profits, revenues

rents made in connection with a mortgage loan are undoubtedly made to secure the debt, but the
court nevertheless stressed the fact that the assignment in that case did not use the words "security"
or "pledge" in holding that it was an absolute assignment. 929 F.2d 1033, 1038 (5th Cir. 1991).
164. 59 Mo. App. 665 (Ct. App. 1894).
165. See id. at 666-67.
166. Id. at 667.
167. See id.
168. Id. at 668.
169. See, e.g., In re Banner, 149 F. 936, 939 (S.D.N.Y. 1907); Sullivan v. Rosson, 119 N.E.
405, 408 (N.Y. 1918).
170. 194 B.R. 267 (Bankr. N.D. Ala. 1996).
171. Id. at278.
172. See id. at 278-79.
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and other income of the premises."' 7 3 The court concluded, based on the
"inconsistent and contradictory language contained in the deed of trust"
and a "presumption that an assignment operates as security for a debt," that
the parties intended a pledge rather than an absolute assignment. 74 In
2006, a Texas bankruptcy court considered an assignment of rents clause
that stated, "[Piriorto Lender's notice to BorrowerofBorrower's breach
of any covenant . . ., Borrower shall collect and receive all rents ... as
trusteefor the benefit of Lender and Borrower.This assignment of rents
constitutes an absolute assignment... "175 The court concluded that the
assignment of rents was a collateral assignment because it made the lender
76
the sole beneficiary of rents only after the lender gave notice of default.' 1
Because of the pretense involved in creating an absolute assignment of
rents, lenders still struggle with these drafting issues, thus incurring
additional transaction costs. Lenders and borrowers must still spend money
litigating these issues, and courts are using scarce judicial resources in
hearing these disputes.
C. State Law Consequences of Confusion over Characterizingan
Absolute Assignment of Rents
Confusion over the characterization of an absolute assignment of rents
as a transfer of title to rents or a security interest has also been a source of
unnecessary litigation. The problems arise because assignments that are in
fact made for security appear on their face to be transfers of title to rent and
because courts characterize absolute assignments of rents as passing
ownership of the rents to the lender. As a result, lenders may be sued by
tenants or other parties as if the lender is the owner of the landlord's
reversion. These problems have also persisted for over a century.
An 1894 case, Cargillv. Thompson,'77 involved an assignment of rents
that on its face was an absolute assignment.1 7 In Cargill, the borrower
executed a deed, absolute on its face, conveying several tracts of land to
the lender, including "the right to receive, collect, and hold all rentals from
any and all persons for the use of said property., 179 In addition to the deed,
the parties executed other agreements providing for reconveyance upon
certain conditions, including repayment of the debt, providing that the
borrower would stay in possession of the property, and providing that the
lender would collect rents and apply them to payment of taxes, insurance,
173.
174.
175.
176.
177.
178.
179.

In re 5877 Poplar, L.P., 268 B.R. 140, 146-47 (Bankr. W.D. Tenn. 2001).
Id. at 147-48.
In re Allen, 357 B.R. 103, 112 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2006).
Id.
59 N.W. 638 (Minn. 1894).
See id. at 638-39.
Id. at 638.
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interest on the debt, repairs, and principal on the debt, with surplus
eventually being returned to the borrower. 8 The lessees sued the lender,
claiming that the transaction was a conditional sale, which put the lender
in privity with lessees, and claiming that the absolute assignment of rents
brought the lender into privity with lessees, making the lender liable under
the lease covenants. 8 ' The court concluded that the transaction was a
mortgage and that an assignment of rents "by way of mortgage" gives the
lender a relationship to rents "the same as that of the mortgagee of the land
towards the legal title,-that of one holding a lien .... He is not, therefore,
an assignee, so as to be liable on the covenants in the lease."' 82
In a similar lawsuit in 1990, a tenant sued a lender for breaches under
' The tenant claimed
a lease that occurred prior to the lender's foreclosure. 83
that the lender's absolute assignment of rents placed the lender in privity
of estate with the tenant and therefore obligated the lender to comply with
lease covenants.' 84 The court did not decide whether the assignment of
rents created "only a pledge or an absolute assignment."' 85 Instead, the
court looked to a provision in the assignment of rents stating that the
assignee was undertaking no obligation under the lease. 86 Based on that
provision, the court held that the lender was not liable.' 87 Therefore, the
court reached the correct result, but incorrectly implied that a finding of an
absolute assignment without any special language abrogating assignee
liability would be relevant in determining whether the lender was liable.
Ten years later, in a suit by a landlord against a tenant for breach of
lease, the tenant argued that the lender was a necessary party in the suit
because of an absolute assignment of rents. 88 The court looked to the
provisions of the assignment of rents that granted the borrower the right to
collect rents until the lender gave notice of default. 89 Because the lender

180. See id. at 638-39.
181. See id. at 639. The lessees also argued that if the lender were merely a mortgagee, he was
liable on lease covenants as a mortgagee-in-possession because he was collecting rents. See id. The
court did not decide the issue whether collecting rents made the lender a mortgagee-in-possession
but found that the lender would not be liable on lease covenants even if he were a mortgagee-inpossession. See id. at 640.
182. Id. at 640.
183. See Naficy v. Woodmen of the World Life Ins. Soc'y, No. A14-89-00964-CV, 1990 WL
122128, at *1 (Tex. App. Aug. 23, 1990). As an unreported case, Naficy does not create precedent,
but it is useful to illustrate the litigation that can result from the use of an absolute assignment of
rents.
184. See id at *5.
185. Id. at *7.
186. See id. at *6.
187. See id. at *7.
188. See Leon's Fine Foods, Inc. v. Merit Inv. Partners, Ltd., No. 05-97-005430CV, 2000 WL
1048491, at *1-2 (Tex. App. July 31, 2000).
at *2.
189. See id.
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never gave notice of default, the court held that the borrower retained the
right to bring or defend a suit under the lease and, therefore, that the lender
was not a necessary party to the suit. 190 Once again, the court reached the
right result, but the court incorrectly implied that a lender with an absolute
assignment of rents could be treated as a party to the lease after default
under the terms of the mortgage.
In another recent case, a mechanic's lien claimant argued that its lien
was superior to a lender's mortgage lien because a purported absolute
assignment of rents gave the lender an interest in property that made the
lender an "owner" under the mechanic's lien statute.' 9 ' The court held for
the lender based on Illinois law, which does not recognize absolute
assignments. 192 The court said that an assignment of rents in Illinois grants
an equitable lien as security for a mortgage.193 Thus, the court implied that
finding an absolute assignment of rents could have changed the result in
the case.
In these particular cases, the courts reached the correct result-that the
lender was not liable under lease covenants, was not a necessary party in
litigation involving a lease, and was not an owner for purposes of a
mechanic's lien statute. However, one has to wonder whether these
arguments would have been made absent the use of a purported "absolute"
assignment of rents. Although reaching the right result, the courts did not
always articulate a good reason for their holdings. In fact, the court in 1894
did a betterj ob of articulating the effect of a purported absolute assignment
of rents than did the later courts because the court acknowledged that the
assignment of rents created a lien on rents rather than an assignment of the
landlord's interest in the lease.1 94 Ultimately, although the absolute
assignment of rents has served lenders in providing a type of security
interest that avoids some of the pitfalls of the collateral assignment of
rents, it has caused needless litigation and confusion. This uncertainty has
carried over into bankruptcy cases in which it has caused more significant
problems.
D. The Absolute Assignment of Rents in Bankruptcy
The confusion regarding characterization of an absolute assignment of
rents as a transfer of title to rents or a security interest has created
uncertainty in bankruptcy cases as well as under state law. Federal courts
are split on the treatment of an absolute assignment of rents when the

190.
191.
192.
193.
194.

See id. at *2-3.
M. Ecker & Co. v. LaSalle Nat'l Bank, 645 N.E.2d 335, 339 (Ill. App. Ct. 1994).
See id. at 340.
See id.
See supra text accompanying note 182.
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debtor is in bankruptcy. Most courts addressing the issue in the bankruptcy
context have held that an absolute assignment gives a lender only a
security interest in rents. 95 These courts recognize the continuing interest
of the bankruptcy estate in rents covered by an absolute assignment and
have held that the rents covered by a duly recorded absolute assignment of
rents are cash collateral.' 96
Some federal courts have treated an absolute assignment of rents as
giving the lender an absolute ownership interest in rents. 97 These courts
have held that, because the lender owns the rents absolutely as a matter of
state law, the bankruptcy estate has no interest in the rents. 98 Therefore,
the bankruptcy trustee or debtor-in-possession has no right to use the rents
to operate and maintain the property in a reorganization.
Bankruptcy courts holding that an absolute assignment of rents gives
a lender ownership of rents rather than a security interest are simply

195. See, e.g., In re Allen, 357 B.R. 103, 115 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2006); Cavros v. Fleet Nat'l
Bank (In re Cavros), 262 B.R. 206, 210-11 (Bankr. D. Conn. 2001); In re 5877 Poplar, L.P., 268
B.R. 140, 146-47 (Bankr. W.D. Tenn. 2001); In re Guardian Realty Group, L.L.C., 205 B.R. 1,4-6
(Bankr. D.D.C. 1997); Lyons v. Fed. Sav. Bank (In re Lyons), 193 B.R. 637, 647-48 (Bankr. D.
Mass. 1996); 500 Ygnacio Assocs., Ltd. v. Aetna Life Ins. Co. (In re 500 Ygnacio Assocs., Ltd.),
141 B.R. 191, 192 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. 1992); Foundry ofBarrington P'ship v. Barrett (In re Foundry
of Barrington P'ship), 129 B.R. 550, 556-57 (Bankr. N.D. I11. 1991); In re Rollingwood
Apartments, Ltd., 133 B.R. 906, 910 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1991); In re Bethesda Air Rights Ltd.
P'ship, 117 B.R. 202, 206 (Bankr. D. Md. 1990); see also FDIC v. Int'l Prop. Mgmt., Inc., 929
F.2d 1033, 1035 (5th Cir. 1991); In re Princeton Overlook Joint Venture, 143 B.R. 625, 633
(Bankr. D.N.J. 1992); Provident Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Winslow Ctr. Assocs. (In re Winslow Ctr.
Assocs.), 50 B.R. 679, 681-82 (Bankr. E.D. Penn. 1985).
196. See PrincetonOverlook, 143 B.R. at 633; Rollingwood, 133 B.R. at 913; Bethesda, 117
B.R. at 209, 211.
197. See, e.g., First Fid. Bank, N.A. v. Jason Realty, L.P. (In re Jason Realty, L.P.), 59 F.3d
423, 427-29 (3d Cir. 1995); In re Kingsport Ventures, L.P., 251 B.R. 841, 848-49 (Bankr. E.D.
Tenn. 2000); In re Carretta, 220 B.R. 203, 211 (Bankr. D.N.J. 1998); Condor One, Inc. v. Turtle
Creek, Ltd. (In re Turtle Creek, Ltd.), 194 B.R. 267, 279 (Bankr. N.D. Ala. 1996); First Fid. Bank
v. Eleven Hundred Metroplex Assocs., 190 B.R. 510, 511 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1995); MacArthur
Executive Assocs. v. State Farm Life Ins. Co., 190 B.R. 189, 195 (Bankr. D.N.J. 1995); In re
Carter, 126 B.R. 811, 813 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1991); In re Galvin, 120 B.R. 767,771-72 (Bankr. D.
Vt. 1990); In re Gould, 78 B.R. 590, 592 (Bankr. D. Idaho 1987); In re Fry Rd. Assocs., Ltd., 64
B.R. 808,809 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1986); In re P.M.G. Props., 55 B.R. 864,870 (Bankr. E.D. Mich.
1985). A related problem in bankruptcy is that some courts have held that a lender owns the rental
stream after enforcing a collateral assignment of rents. See Commerce Bank v. Mountain View
Vill., Inc., 5 F.3d 34 (3d Cir. 1993); In re Century Inv. Fund VIII Ltd. P'ship, 937 F.2d 371, 375
(7th Cir. 1991); Robin Assocs. v. Metro. Bank & Trust Co. (In re Robin Assocs.), 275 B.R. 218
(Bankr. W.D. Pa. 2001); VIII S. Mich. Assocs. v. N. Trust Co. (In re VIII S. Michigan Assocs.),
145 B.R. 912 (N.D. Ill. 1992); In re Mount Pleasant Ltd. P'ship, 144 B.R. 727 (Bankr. W.D. Mich.
1992); Imperial Gardens Liquidating Trust v. Nw. Commons, Inc. (In re Nw. Commons), 136 B.R.
215 (Bankr. E.D. Mo. 1991).
198. See ln re Carter, 126 B.R. at 813; In re Galvin, 120 B.R. at 772; In re Fry Rd. Assocs.,
64 B.R. at 809; In re P.MG. Props., 55 B.R. at 870.
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incorrect. Although the form of the transaction may indicate a transfer of
title to rents, the substance of such a transaction is a security interest. Some
of these courts are following state law precedent on the theory that
property rights are a matter of state law. 99
' They should, however, "look to
the substance of state law rights, not merely the label that state law places
on them."2 °°
The better-reasoned bankruptcy opinions look to the substance of the
transaction and to factors such as the borrower's right to collect rents until
default, the lender's obligation to apply rents to payment of the debt, and
the termination of the assignment of rents upon payment of the loan in
full.2"' If the borrower has any remaining property rights in the rental
stream under state law, bankruptcy law dictates that the rental stream be
treated as part of the bankruptcy estate.20 2
When a court holds that rents covered by an absolute assignment are
owned by the lender, the debtor-in-possession does not have the rents
available for operation and maintenance of the mortgaged property, as
would be the case if rents were treated as cash collateral.2 3 If rents are
unavailable for operation and maintenance of the property, almost no hope
of reorganization exists for a borrower in Chapter 11.21 If the debtor has
no equity in the property and there is not "'a reasonable possibility of a
successful reorganization within a reasonable time,' 2 5 the lender is

199. See JasonRealty, 59 F.3d at 427 (citing Butner v. United States, 440 U.S. 48, 55 (1979)).
200. In re GuardianRealty, 205 B.R. at 4 (citing United States v. Nat'l Bank of Commerce,
472 U.S. 713, 727 (1985)).
201. See id.; 500 Ygnacio Assocs., Ltd. v. Aetna Life Ins. Co. (In re 500 Ygnacio Assocs.),
141 B.R. 191, 195 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. 1992); In re Bethesda, 117 B.R. at 206-08; Bryn Athyn
Investors, Ltd. v. Hutton/Conam Realty Pension Investors (In re Bryn Athyn Investors, Ltd.), 69
B.R. 452, 457 (Bankr. E.D.N.C. 1987).
202. See 11 U.S.C.A. § 541 (West 2007); United States v. Whiting Pools, Inc., 462 U.S. 198,
208-09 (1983).
203. If rents are cash collateral, the debtor-in-possession may not use the rents without consent
of the lender or authorization of the bankruptcy court. See 11 U.S.C.A. § 363(c)(2). A bankruptcy
court may not authorize the use of cash collateral by the debtor unless the secured lender is
adequately protected. See id. § 363(e). Bankruptcy courts generally permit the debtor to use rents
for operation and maintenance of the mortgaged property because that use preserves the value of
the property and, thus, provides the lender adequate protection. See Forrester, supra note 2, at 388.
204. See Craig A. Averch, Revisitation ofthe Fifth CircuitOpinionsofVillage Properties and
Casbeer: Is Post-Petition"Perfection"ofan Assignment ofRents Necessary to CharacterizeRental
Income as Cash Collateral?,93 CoM. L.J. 516, 519 (1988); Carlson, supra note 7, at 1109. In a
single-asset bankruptcy, the borrower will have no income available to continue operation and
maintenance of the mortgaged property. See Carlson, supra note 7, at 1152-53.
205. United Sav. Ass'n of Tex. v. Timbers of Inwood Forest Assocs., Ltd. (In re Timbers of
Inwood Forest Assocs., Ltd.), 484 U.S. 365, 376 (1988) (quoting United Sav. Ass'n of Tex. v.
Timbers of Inwood Forest Assocs., Ltd., 808 F.2d 363, 370-71 & nn. 12-13 (5th Cir. 1987), aff'd,
484 U.S. 365 (1988)).
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entitled to relief from the automatic stay.2°6 Therefore, the borrower's
efforts to reorganize under the protection of Chapter 11 will be frustrated
even in those cases where a reorganization might otherwise have been
successful. 2 7 This result defeats the policies behind the Bankruptcy Code
and Chapter 11, is simply an injustice.
E. Analogous "Absolute" Transfersfor Security
Many types of transactions create a security interest in substance but
take on another form. Courts interpret these various transactions regularly
and are accustomed to considering substance over form. Some examples
include the mortgage in a title theory state, the absolute deed of real
property given as security for a loan, and certain sale-leaseback
transactions involving equipment and other personal property. These
analogous situations are valuable tools for use in analyzing the treatment
of assignments of rents.
In title theory states, a mortgage is treated as a conveyance that gives
title to the lender.20 8 However, when faced with determining the substance
of the transaction, courts acknowledge that the mortgagor "is the equitable
owner of the property and thus its real owner" during the term of the
mortgage. 2 9 Therefore, a mortgagor could not escape a conviction for
violation of building ordinances on the ground that the mortgagee had legal
title to the property,20 and a mortgagee could not escape the payment of
transfer taxes upon purchase at foreclosure sale on the basis that it already
had legal title to the property. 211 The Rhode Island Supreme Court called
the title theory "a fiction designed to aid in decision making ...not an
absolute per se rule of law. 21 2 Therefore, courts have been able to focus
on the substance of the mortgage transaction when necessary.
Even in states that do not follow the title theory of mortgages, the
parties to a mortgage loan transaction may document that transaction as a
sale of the property rather than as a mortgage.213 Under some circumstances,
usually involving an unsophisticated borrower in desperate need of credit,

206. See 11 U.S.C.A. § 362(d)(2).
207. Ifthe lender istreated as the owner of rents under an absolute assignment of rents, rents
are not available for operation and maintenance of the property, and the lender is likely to be
granted relief from the stay and thus be permitted to foreclose. See First Fid. Bank v. Jason Realty,
L.P. (Inre Jason Realty, L.P.), 59 F.3d 423, 430 (3d Cir. 1995); Inre Fry Rd. Assocs., Ltd., 66
B.R. 602, 604-05 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1986).
208. See Block Island Land Trust v. Wash. Trust Co., 713 A.2d 199, 201 (R.I. 1998).
209. State v.Stonybrook, Inc., 181 A.2d 601, 604 (Conn. 1962).
210. See id.
at 604-05.
211. See Block Island,713 A.2d at 201.
212. Id.
App.Ct. 1990).
Flack v. McClure, 565 N.E.2d 131, 135 (Ill.
213. See, e.g.,

THE ABSOLUTE ASSIGNMENT OF RENTS IN MORTGAGE LOAN TRANSACTIONS

the borrower will give a lender an absolute deed to property to secure a
loan.2' 1 4 The parties typically agree that the lender will return the deed
unrecorded upon repayment of the debt.215 In determining the substance of
the transaction, courts consider a number of factors, including whether a
debt exists, whether the grantor retained possession of the property,
whether a disparity exists between the value of the property and the
consideration, and whether the parties agree to a reconveyance. 16 Courts
permit the introduction of parol evidence to prove the true nature of the
transaction.2"7 If a court determines that the substance of such a transaction
is in fact a mortgage rather than a transfer of title, the court will treat the
deed as a mortgage on the property. Therefore, in the context of the
absolute deed intended as security, courts have been able to look beyond
the form of the transaction to determine its substance.
With regard to personal-property-secured transactions, the scope
provision of Article 9 of the U.C.C. applies to "a transaction, regardless of
its form, that creates a security interest in personal property or fixtures by
contract."2" 8 The purpose of this provision is to consider the substance of
a transaction rather than its form.2" 9 Therefore, courts are often asked to
determine whether a transaction is a true lease or an installment sale with
the "lessor" retaining a security interest securing the obligation of the
"lessee" to purchase goods.22°
Courts must also distinguish between a true sale of personal property
and a transfer that creates a security interest. Although Article 9 covers
sales of accounts, chattel paper, payment intangibles, and promissory
notes, 221 a true sale receives different treatment under Article 9 and must,
therefore, be distinguished from a transaction that creates a security
interest. Sales of these intangibles are covered by Article 9 for purposes of
perfection. If the purchaser fails to perfect its interest, the seller retains the
power to transfer good title to a subsequent purchaser,222 just as with real
property recording acts. At the same time, however, the seller "does not

214. See id.
215. See id.
216. See id. at 136; Johnson v. Cherry, 726 S.W.2d 4,7 (Tex. 1987); Sannerud v. Brantz, 928
P.2d 477, 481 (Wyo. 1996); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: MORTGAGES §§ 3.2(b), 3.3(b)
(1997); NELSON & WHITMAN, supranote 21, § 3.8.
217. See NELSON & WHITMAN, supranote 21, § 3.6.
218. U.C.C. § 9-109(a)(1) (2000). In addition, Article 9 applies to some transactions that are
not intended to create a security interest, including "a sale of accounts, chattel paper, payment
intangible, or promissory notes" and "a consignment." Id. § 9-109(a)(3), (4).
219. See WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 39, § 21-2.
220. Id. §21-3.
221. See U.C.C. § 9-109(a)(3).
222. See id. § 9-318(b).
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retain a legal or equitable interest in the collateral sold. 223 Sales of these
intangibles have raised some ofthe same issues in bankruptcy that absolute
assignments of rents have raised. 224 If a transfer is a true sale, a bankruptcy
trustee or debtor-in-possession has no interest in the property transferred,
but if the transfer is of a security interest only, the bankruptcy estate retains
an interest in the collateral. Courts seem to have navigated these issues
more successfully than issues relating to absolute assignments of rents.
V. SOLUTIONS TO THE PROBLEM

The absolute assignment of rents is not a satisfactory method of
creating a security interest in rents. It causes problems for lenders in
drafting and enforcing the assignment of rents. It causes injustice for
borrowers in bankruptcy. It causes unnecessary litigation that may raise the
cost of credit. It is, nevertheless, the best alternative for lenders at this
time. The absolute assignment of rents cannot simply be eliminated unless
replaced by a workable solution to the problems it solves. Therefore,
comprehensive change is necessary. This change has occurred gradually in
some states through the judicial process, but the legislative process
provides a faster and more comprehensive solution.
A. The JudicialSolution
Courts may adopt the Restatement approach, which provides a
workable system for lenders to take a security interest in rents, making the
absolute assignment unnecessary. 225 The Restatement takes the position
that "[t]he use of 'absolute assignment' terminology ...creates needless
confusion and is rejected., 226 In fact, the Restatement uses the terminology
that rents are "mortgage[d]" rather than assigned to avoid the confusion
that the absolute assignment doctrine has engendered.2 27
Because the Restatement resolves the problems that lenders have
encountered with the collateral assignment of rents, lenders would not need
the absolute assignment of rents under the Restatement regime. First, the
Restatement provides that a mortgage of rents "is effective as against the
mortgagor and, subject to the operation of the recording act, as against
third parties, upon execution and delivery., 228 Therefore, a recorded
mortgage of rents would have priority over a creditor garnishing rents and

223. Id. § 9-318(a).
224. See, e.g., Octagon Gas Sys., Inc. v. Rimmer (In re Meridian Reserve, Inc.), 995 F.2d 948,
957 (10th Cir. 1993); In re LTV Steel Co., 274 B.R. 278,285-86 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 2001).
225. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: MORTGAGES § 4.2 (1997).
226. Id.§ 4.2 cmt. a.
227. Id.§ 4.2 cmt. b.
228. Id.§ 4.2(b).
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would not be subject to avoidance by a trustee in bankruptcy. Second, the
Restatement provides that a mortgage may entitle the lender to collect rents
upon default and is enforced by "delivery of a demand for the rents to the
' Therefore, a lender is not required
mortgagor."229
to take any burdensome
action such as taking possession or obtaining the appointment of a receiver
in order to enforce the assignment of rents. A lender would not be entitled
to rents that the mortgagor collected after default and before the demand
is made, but lenders can easily make demand after default in order to
capture rents that accrue after default. Therefore, the Restatement resolves
the perfection problem and the enforcement problem that lenders have
faced with collateral assignments of rents. With a workable scheme for
mortgaging rents, the absolute assignment of rents becomes unnecessary.
Thus, judicial adoption of the Restatement approach to mortgaging rents
would solve the problems existing under current law.
B. The Uniform Assignment of Rents Act
The new Uniform Assignment of Rents Act (UARA) provides an even
better solution to the problems caused by the absolute assignment of rents.
The UARA is more comprehensive in scope than the Restatement, and it
can be adopted as a package by state legislatures rather than in a piecemeal
fashion by the courts.
The UARA provides that an assignment of rents, including an
assignment absolute in form, creates a security interest regardless of its
form.23 Therefore, an absolute assignment of rents made in connection
with a mortgage loan would be treated the same as any assignment of rents
under the Act.23' In addition, because the UARA provides for a workable
security interest in rents for mortgage lenders with due regard for the
concerns of borrowers and tenants, it eliminates the need for an absolute

229. Id. § 4.2(c)(2). In addition to the demand, the lender must satisfy any additional
conditions imposed by the mortgage, see id. § 4.2(c)(1), and the demand must also be delivered to
the owner of the property and other lienholders, see id.§ 4.2(c)(2).
230. UNIF. ASSIGNMENT OF RENTS ACT § 4(b) (2005).
23 1. The comments to § 4 provide:
[N]othing in the Act precludes an owner of real property from making a truly
absolute transfer of rents in a transaction that is not a security transaction, such as
a "true sale" of rents (in which the owner of the real property transfers full legal,
equitable ownership and control of unaccrued rents immediately upon execution
and delivery). Such a transfer, however, is not an "assignment of rents" as defined
in the Act (unless applicable state law dictates otherwise), and thus the provisions
of the Act governing the enforcement of an assignment of rents would not apply
to such a transfer.
Id. § 4 cmt. 3.
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assignment of rents.
The UARA resolves the problems that lenders have encountered with
collateral assignments of rents. First, the Act provides that an assignment
of rents is fully perfected upon recordation. 32 The Act further provides that
a perfected security interest in rents has priority against a judicial lien
creditor or a purchaser of the rents or the real property.233 With state law
clarified by the Act, a recorded assignment of rents would be treated as
perfected in bankruptcy, resolving that issue once and for all. Therefore,
the Act resolves the perfection problem that lenders have tried to avoid by
using absolute assignments.
Second, the UARA provides detailed provisions relating to the
enforcement of an assignment of rents. Under the Act, an assignment of
rents may be enforced by obtaining the appointment of a receiver,234 by
giving notice to the mortgagor,235 by giving notice to the tenants,236 or by
any other method permitted under the particular state's law.237 Therefore,
a lender is not required to take any burdensome action in order to enforce
the assignment of rents. The lender is entitled to collect from tenants those
rents that accrue on or after the date of enforcement or that previously
accrued but remain unpaid on the date of enforcement.238
The Act makes the borrower personally liable for failing to turn over
to the lender rents that the borrower collects after the date of
enforcement.239 This provision is particularly important for the lender if the
borrower is not personally liable for the debt because the debt is nonrecourse or because the mortgaged property has been conveyed to a nonassuming grantee. 24" Although most courts hold that the borrower's
misapplication of rents is waste,24' the Act makes clear the liability of a
borrower who wrongfully fails to turn over rents.

232. See id. § 5(b).
233. See id. § 5(c).
234. See id. § 7. This provision also lays out the requirements for a lender to obtain the
appointment of a receiver. See id.
235. See id. § 8. The notice must also be sent to the holders of other recorded assignments of
rents. See id. § 8(a).
236. See id. § 9.
237. See id. § 6(a).
238. See id. § 6(b). The Act does not give the lender a right to proceeds of rents collected by
the borrower before the date of enforcement. See id. § 6 cmt. 2.
239. See id. § 14(b), (d). The lender is also entitled to reasonable attorneys' fees and costs if
provided for by agreement. See id. § 14(d)(2).
240. A grantee of mortgaged property not personally liable on the debt should nevertheless by
liable for misapplying rents.
241. See, e.g., Ginsberg v. Lennar Fla. Holdings, Inc., 645 So. 2d 490, 500 (Fla. 3d DCA
1994); Taylor v. Brennan, 621 S.W.2d 592, 593 (Tex. 1981); UNiF. ASSIGNMENT OF RENTS ACT
§ 14 cmt. 1; RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: MORTGAGES § 4.6(a)(5) (1997).
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Third, the UARA addresses the issue of the lender's security interest in
proceeds of rents collected by the borrower after the mortgage lender
enforces its assignment of rents. The Act makes clear that the mortgage
lender has a security interest in identifiable cash proceeds of such rents242
and that the security interest in proceeds is perfected if the security interest
in rents is perfected.243 The Act deals with priority issues relating to cash
proceeds in the same manner as Article 9 of the U.C.C. 24 Therefore, the
Act provides a comprehensive scheme for the enforcement of an
assignment of rents.
The UARA goes much further to clarify and define the rights and duties
of the parties to an assignment of rents and to resolve in advance the issues
that the parties and tenants affected by an assignment of rents might need
to litigate. First, the Act provides that the enforcement of an assignment of
rents does not "make the assignee a mortgagee-in-possession of the real
property., 245 A few courts have found that a lender collecting rents
pursuant to an assignment of rents is a mortgagee-in-possession with the
attendant liabilities.246 Lenders tend to avoid taking possession of
mortgaged property prior to foreclosure to avoid these liabilities, and,
therefore, lenders do not want to be liable as a mortgagee-in-possession
simply because they are collecting rent. The UARA resolves this issue by
providing that the lender does not become a mortgagee-in-possession
simply by virtue of collecting rents.247 The Act further provides that the
lender is not obligated by virtue of collecting rents to pay "expenses of
protecting or maintaining the real property., 248 The assumption is that
mortgage lenders have sufficient incentive to pay taxes and insurance
premiums and to maintain the mortgaged property if the borrower is unable
or unwilling to do so. 24 9 The Act makes clear that if the lender's failure to
maintain the property results in a breach of the lease by the landlord,
tenants may have a defense to paying rent. 25" Furthermore, tenants may be
entitled to the appointment of a receiver to protect and maintain the

242. See UNIF. ASSIGNMENT OF RENTS ACT § 14(b)(2). The Act does not give the lender a
security interest in proceeds of rents collected by the borrower before the date of enforcement. See
id. § 6 cmt. 2.
243. See id. § 15(b). "[Clash proceeds are identifiable if they are maintained in a segregated
account or ... to the extent the assignee can identify them by a method of tracing .... " Id
§ 14(c).
244. See id. § 15(c).
245. Id. § 11(1).
246. See supra note 82.
247. See UNIF. ASSIGNMENT OF RENTS ACT § 11 cmt. 1.

248. Id. § 13(a).
249. See Freyermuth, The New UARA, supra note 7, at 55-56.
250. See UNIF. ASSIGNMENT OF RENTS ACT § 13(b).
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property.25 Therefore, the concerns of tenants, as well as borrowers and
lenders, are considered in the Act.
The Act also addresses other concerns that tenants have relating to the
enforcement of an assignment of rents. Tenants receiving notice to begin
paying rent to a lender rather than to the landlord are understandably
reluctant to do so because of the risk that they may pay the wrong party.
Tenants in this position often stop paying rent altogether to avoid paying
the wrong party. The Act provides detailed provisions that strongly
encourage tenants to pay an assignee who has exercised its rights under an
assignment of rents rather than the landlord and at the same time protect
the tenants in paying the assignee.252 In addition, tenants are given a grace
period for payment of rent after receiving a notice during which time the
tenant may seek the advice of counsel.2 3 These provisions of the Act
should make tenants more likely to pay rent to a lender who has enforced
an assignment of rents and at the same time alleviate tenants' concerns
about making the payments.
The Act considers and balances the rights of borrowers, lenders, and
tenants. It would eliminate the need for absolute assignments of rents by
creating a workable security interest for lenders. It would therefore reduce
transaction costs and litigation caused by this device. The Act would
resolve confusion over the perfection of an assignment of rents. In
addition, under the Act, lenders could enforce an assignment of rents upon
default simply by giving notice to the borrower or tenants. For borrowers,
this method of enforcement is no more onerous than rights that lenders
have under current law to enforce an absolute assignment of rents. In
addition, for the benefit of borrowers, an absolute assignment of rents
could no longer be used by lenders to block a borrower's ability to
reorganize under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code. Furthermore, the Act
addresses tenants' concerns. Overall, the Act provides a clear and
comprehensive scheme for the creation of security interests in rents.
VI. CONCLUSION

The law regarding assignments of rents has been in great disarray for
more than a century. Lenders, dissatisfied with the problems they have
encountered with collateral assignments of rents in many states, have
turned to the absolute assignment of rents as a solution. The absolute
assignment, however, has caused even more confusion. Courts have made
drafting an absolute assignment difficult to accomplish by requiring the
pretense of a transfer of title to the rents. Courts have caused additional

251. See id. § 13(c).
252. See id. § 9(c), (d).
253. See id. § 9(d) & cmt. 5.
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uncertainty by treating absolute assignments as a transfer of title to rents,
when in fact they simply create a different type of security interest. The
refusal of courts to give lenders reasonable security interests under
collateral assignments and lenders' use of absolute assignments to
overcome the deficiencies of collateral assignments have led to additional
transaction costs and unnecessary litigation.
A solution to the century-old problems relating to assignments of rents
in mortgage loan transactions is now at hand. The new Uniform
Assignment of Rents Act provides a comprehensive and logical scheme for
creating security interests in rents that will satisfy mortgage lenders while
considering the needs of borrowers and tenants. State legislatures should
consider and adopt this Act.

